The Continuing Controversy Surrounding Delayed Funds Availability by Ellis, Nan S.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 2 Winter 1987 Article 3 
The Continuing Controversy Surrounding Delayed Funds 
Availability 
Nan S. Ellis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Nan S. Ellis, The Continuing Controversy Surrounding Delayed Funds Availability, 36 DePaul L. Rev. 189 
(1987) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol36/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING
DELAYED FUNDS AVAILABILITY
Nan S. Ellis*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a customer deposits a paycheck into a bank' account, at what point
does that customer have a right to access those funds? This question encom-
passes a situation where customers rely on those funds for cash withdrawal
as well as where customers rely on those funds to cover a check drawn upon
an account. Contrary to the popular perception of immediate availability,
the answer to this question is not as simple as one might presume. To a
large extent, the best answer is "whenever his bank will let him." 2 The
customer's bank generally gains provisional access to those funds within two
days.' However, banks commonly put a "hold" on checks in the collection
process anywhere from five to twenty days.4 This creates a daily float5
available to banks which has been estimated to produce approximately $290
* Associate Professor of Law, Sellinger School of Business and Management, Loyola
College, Maryland; B.A., 1974, Ohio State University; J.D., 1977, Ohio State University.
1. The term "bank" is used in this Article to encompass all forms of financial institutions
that accept items for deposit, including savings and loan and thrift institutions. For the Uniform
Commercial Code definition of the term "bank," see U.C.C. § 1-201(4) (1976).
2. This should not be confused with the question of when banks might allow customers
to draw on those funds as a matter of accommodation to a valued customer. Despite standard
hold periods, it is common for banks to make exceptions and allow customers access to
deposited funds before expiration of the hold period. See, e.g., Cooper, Checks Held Hostage-
The Funds Availability Controversy, 102 BANKING L.J. 532 (1985); Jordan, Ending the Floating
Check Game: The Policy Arguments for Delayed Availability Reform, 36 HAsTINrGs L.J. 515
(1985). This created problems for at least one bank. In Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of
Bladenboro, 596 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1979), the court found that the bank was contributorily
negligent for failing to observe the established hold period. For a discussion of this case, see
infra note 136.
3. This is termed provisional credit or provisional settlement. For a discussion of the
bank collection process, see infra notes 39-68 and accompanying text. Banks make provisional
settlements in no more than two days when they process checks through the Federal Reserve
System. The Federal Reserve System has availability schedules by which banks operate. Baxter
& Patrikis, The Check Hold Revolution, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 99, 116 (1985); Jordan, supra note 2,
at 527-28.
4. Baxter & Patrikis, supra note 3, at 99; Cooper, supra note 2, at 554-55; Jordan,
supra note 2, at 516; Wechsler, Delayed Funds Availability, 35 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1117, 1120-
21 n.3 (1984).
S. The daily float has been estimated at $3.2 billion per year. Jordan, supra note 2, at
529.
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million 6 per year in revenue, all at the expense of the bank customer who
often suffers while awaiting access to funds. 7
This delay has been the subject of increasing debate. Advocates of reform
assert that hold periods are attempts by banks to get interest-free use of
their customers' funds.8 Banks, on the other hand, attribute the need for
hold periods to the risks associated with dishonored checks and loss by
fraud. 9 The disagreement has been the source of public outcry against
imposition of hold periods.10 A study conducted for the Federal Reserve
System revealed that eleven per cent of bank customers have problems with
availability of funds."1 Consumer groups have raised complaints, lawsuits
have been initiated, and administrative 2 and legislative 3 reform has been
proposed.
6. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985); Cooper, supra note 2, at 534.
7. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussion of the hardships imposed
on depositors by delayed hold periods).
8. Miller, Ballen & Scott, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections and
Commercial Electronic Funds Transfers, 39 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1360-64 (1984); Jordan, supra
note 2, at 516; Cooper, The Banker's Float That Sinks Depositors, 43 Soc. SERv. REV. 42
(1982). Federal Reserve figures show that depositary institutions earn approximately $290 million
each year through this practice. Cooper, supra note 2, at 534.
9. There is little disagreement that banks face some risk of loss that can be minimized
by imposing substantial hold periods. See, e.g., Baxter & Patrikis, supra note 3, at 100; Cooper,
supra note 2, at 533; Jordan, supra note 2, at 516; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1121. One author
categorizes two types of risks: credit-risk loss and fraud-risk loss. Credit-risk loss entails the
danger that the deposited item will eventually be returned because of insufficient funds, no
account, or because of a stop payment order. Fraud-risk loss includes the risk of forged
endorsements, forged drawer's signatures, material alteration, and check kiting schemes. Cooper,
supra note 2, at 533.
10. This has been the subject of numerous articles in the popular press. See, e.g., Ballen,
There Are No Easy Solutions to the Delayed-Availability Problem, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1984,
at 15-16, 19; Cooper, The Float: How Banks Make Money With Your Money, THE NATION,
June 5, 1982, at 682; That 1% Float, Time, May 16, 1983, at 59, col. 1; Bettner, Banks Still
Placing Lengthy Holds on Checks Despite Quick Clearing, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1983, at 31,
col. 3.
11. Should Government Say When You Make Funds Available?, 76 A.B.A. BANKING J.
140 (1984). This refers to a survey conducted through the research center of the University of
Michigan. There is disagreement as to the significance of this figure. Some commentators
believe this represents significant dissatisfaction, while others assert that it represents an insig-
nificant degree of complaint. The study also revealed that 43% of complainants believed their
problems arose because they were unaware of the bank's policies. A number of studies have
produced similar results. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 2, at 536-37. More recent studies reveal
that the number of consumer complaints has risen slightly. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 15 (1985).
12. Regulation J was amended, in part, to speak to the problem of delayed funds
availability. See 12 C.F.R. § 210.2(c) (1986); 50 Fed. Reg. 5734 (1985); infra notes 247-53 and
accompanying text. In addition, it has been urged that the Federal Reserve Board implement
reform of the check collection return process. See infra notes 185-88, 219-21 and accompanying
text.
13. In addition to a plethora of state statutes, several federal statutes have been intro-
duced. See infra notes 142, 147 and accompanying text.
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This Article examines the debate surrounding delayed funds availability.
The Article first examines the workings of the check collection process
because the rationale for the imposition of any availability hold is intricately
tied to that process. The Article then examines the delays typically imposed,
as well as the problems encountered by bank customers caused by such
delays. After concluding that these delays are unreasonable and unfair to
bank customers, the Article discusses recently proposed solutions.
II. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The banks' primary justification for hold periods is that they are needed
to minimize the risk of loss from returned checks. To understand this
rationale, one must first understand how a check is presented for collection.
The mechanism for check collection is regulated both by the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and by Federal Reserve Board Regulation J. 4
When a drawer 5 draws and delivers a check 6 to a payee, 7 the payee
typically wishes to obtain payment on the item."8 The payee might present 9
the check directly to the drawee bank2" for payment. 2' If the payee chooses
this method, the time period within which the drawee bank must act 22 on
the item is clearly set forth in the U.C.C. section 3-506(2). That section
provides that the drawee bank must, in this situation, pay or return the item
by the close of business on the day of presentment. 23 No substantial delay
in availability is presented by this situation.
14. Federal Reserve Board Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1986).
15. Although not defined in the U.C.C., the "drawer" of a check is generally the owner
of the account on which the check is drawn and from which the check will be paid. The drawer
is typically the person who wrote and signed the check. See R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT,
INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION 64 (1977); E. COMPTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING
62 (1983); D. WHALEY, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 3-4, 23 (1981);
Dow & Ellis, The Proposed Uniform New Payments Code: Allocation of Losses Resulting
From Forged Drawer's Signatures, 2 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 399, 402 n.12 (1985).
16. A check is "a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand." U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b)
(1977). It is a written order by a drawer to the drawee to pay a sum of money to a third party.
R. BRAUCHER & R. RIFGERT, supra note 15, at 402 n.12.
17. The "payee" is the person to whom the drawee bank is ordered to effect payment
of a draft. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b); R, BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 15, at 64.
18. In the context of bank collections, the check is alternatively referred to as an "item."
U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(g) (1977).
19. "Presentment" is a demand for payment made upon the drawee bank. Id. § 3-504(1).
20. The drawee is the entity on which the check or draft is drawn. U.C.C. § 3-503(2)
(1977). R. BRAUCHER & R. RiEGERT, supra note 15, at 64; D. WHALEY, supra note 15, at 3-4.
After a check has entered the bank collection process, U.C.C. Article 4 terms the drawee the
payor bank. For a definition of the payor bank, see infra note 29.
21. Few checks are actually presented in this manner. E. COMPTON, supra note 15, at
152; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1125 n.23.
22. The term "pay" is used throughout this paper to connote final payment. See U.C.C.
§ 4-213 (1977). For a discussion of what constitutes final payment, see infra note 54 and
accompanying text.
23. U.C.C. § 3-506(2) (1977).
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More commonly, however, the payee will use its own bank as a collecting
agent rather than presenting the check directly to the drawee bank. 4 Thus,
the relevant inquiry involves the interaction between the payee and its bank.
It is clear that if one deposits money5 in an account the money is available
as of the opening of the banking day26 following the banking day of deposit.
2 7
On the other hand, if the payee deposits a check into an account when does
the payee have the right to access those funds? The U.C.C. clearly sets forth
the timetable for availability in the former situation. Where the depositary
bank 28 is also the payor bank,2 9 the bank must make the funds available for
withdrawal at the opening of the bank's second banking day following
deposit.3 0 For example, if a check drawn on the First National Bank is
deposited into an account with the First National Bank on Monday, the
funds become available as of right on Wednesday morning. During this time,
the First National Bank ascertains whether the item is properly payable, 3
whether or not there are sufficient funds in the drawer's account, and then
it posts32 the item to the drawer's account. Generally, this delay is not
considered to cause a significant hardship on depositors. These checks,
termed "on-us" items, represent one-half of the checks written in this
country. 3
The delay becomes more lengthy when the depositary bank is not the same
bank as the payor bank. Here, the U.C.C. gives very little guidance, pro-
24. Obviously, if the drawer draws the item on a New York bank and mails the check
to a payee in California, it is unlikely that the California payee would journey to New York
to collect the check.
25. In this context, money refers to cash.
26. The U.C.C. defines "banking day" as "that part of any day on which a bank is
open to the public for carrying on substantially all of its banking functions." U.C.C. § 4-
104(l)(c) (1978).
27. Id. § 4-213(5). The average bank customer might be surprised to know that such
funds are not immediately available. The bank is given time to credit the funds to the customer's
account. Presumably, the bank could accomplish this task in much less time. Regardless, this
delay is not the subject of the debate surrounding delayed funds availability.
28. The U.C.C. defines the "depositary bank" as the "first collecting bank to which an
item is transferred for collection even though it is also the payor bank." Id. § 4-105(a).
29. The U.C.C. defines the "payor bank" as "a bank by which an item is payable as
drawn or accepted." Id. § 4-105(b). The payor bank is also referred to as the drawee bank.
See id. § 3-102 comment 3.
30.. Id. § 4-213(4)(b).
31. Under U.C.C. section 4-401(1), a bank is permitted to charge its customer's account
for properly payable items. By implication, it cannot charge its customer's account for items
that are not properly payable. Although the U.C.C. does not expressly provide, it is clear that
items containing forged drawer's signatures and forged endorsements are not properly payable.
See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 831, 149
Cal. Rptr. 883, 905 (1978); B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIo NS AND CREDIT
CARDS § 6.4[21, at 6-36 (rev. ed. 1986).
32. The U.C.C. defines the process of posting in section 4-109 as "the usual procedure
followed by a payor bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the payment." U.C.C.
§ 4-109 (1978).
33. Jordan, supra note 2, at 521.
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viding only that the depositary bank must make the deposited funds available
to its customer as of right when final payment3 4 occurs and the bank has
had a reasonable time to learn that the settlement35 is final.36 In order to
understand this provision, one must first examine the concept of final
payment. To do so requires a more complete understanding of how the bank
collection process works. Because the depositary bank generally has no way
of knowing when final payment has occurred,3 7 substantial delays are often
routinely imposed before the bank will allow its customer to withdraw funds.
III. THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
To understand the reasoning behind the imposition of such delayed avail-
ability schedules it is necessary to understand more fully the process through
which checks are collected. The bank collection38 process is the method by
which the payee, or person to whom the item was transferred, is able to
obtain payment. Collection begins when such person deposits the item in a
depositary bank. The collection process is essentially one of transferring the
item from the depositary bank to the payor bank and remitting the proceeds
back to the depositary bank and eventually to the customer. The primary
responsibility of collecting banks,3 9 including the depositary bank, is to
forward the item to the payor bank using a reasonably prompt method40
with the exercise of ordinary care.4 1 The complexity of the actual process
varies with the number of banks handling the item. The time period necessary
to collect the item varies, depending upon the number of intermediary banks42
34. For a discussion of what constitutes final payment, see infra note 54 and accompa-
nying text.
35. "'Settle' means to pay in cash, by clearing house settlement, in a charge or credit
or by remittance, or otherwise as instructed. A settlement may be either provisional or final."
U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(J) (1977).
36. Id. § 4-213(4)(a). The problem, of course, is that the depositary bank will never learn
when payment is final. It will only learn if the item has been dishonored. See infra notes 54-
58 and accompanying text. It is this lack of knowledge that creates the risk of loss that banks
attempt to avoid by imposing availability delays.
37. The depositary bank must assume that final payment has occurred when sufficient
time has elapsed for notice of dishonor to be given. This is due to the nature of the bank
collection process. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
38. What follows is a brief overview of the check collection process. It is not intended
to be a complete treatment of the topic. See also Dow & Ellis, supra note 15, at 402-09;
Malcolm, How Bank Collection Works Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How.
L.J. 71 (1965) (further discussion on this topic).
39. The U.C.C. defines "collecting bank" as "any bank handling the item for collection
except the payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105(d) (1977).
40. Id. § 4-204(l).
41. Id. § 4-202(1). A collecting bank is deemed to have acted "seasonably" if it forwards
the item on or before midnight of the banking day following receipt of the item. Id. § 4-202(2).
42. The U.C.C. defines "intermediary bank" as "any bank to which an item is transferred
in the course of collection except the depositary or payor bank." Id. § 4-105(c). The depositary
and all intermediary banks are also termed collecting banks because they handle the item for
collection. See id. § 4-105(d).
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and the distance between the depositary and payor bank.43 Whether the
check will be processed through an intermediary bank, and, if so, the number
of intermediary banks, depends almost entirely upon the distance between
the depositary and payor bank, as well as upon whether or not either bank
is a member of the Federal Reserve System."
When the payee deposits the check into his account with the depositary
bank, the depositary bank will credit the payee's account for the amount of
the item. The credit is provisional at this point, subject to reversal 4 should
the item subsequently be dishonored46 by the payor bank. In addition to
provisionally crediting the account of the depositor, the depositary bank
debits the account of the bank to which the item is next forwarded. 47 If the
depositary bank is not a member of the Federal Reserve System, it might
forward the check to a correspondent bank which is a Federal Reserve
member. Corresponding debits and credits accompany the physical transfer
of the item at each step.
Ultimately, the item is presented to the payor bank for payment. At this
point, the payor bank determines whether the item should be paid or
dishonored. While it is making this determination the payor bank typically
makes provisional settlement for the item by crediting the account of the
presenting bank.48 The provisional credit must be given by midnight of the
banking day of receipt of the item.4 9
The process by which the item moves toward the payor bank works
primarily by computer.5 0 The information required to process the item is
43. See id. § 4-213 comment 10.
44. Malcolm, supra note 38. "Most non-local checks clear through the Federal Reserve
.... In fact, it is estimated that between one-third and one-half of all checks written are
collected through the Federal Reserve." R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 15, at 105
(emphasis added). See Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734, 5736 (1985) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210.12).
45. This right of reversal, called chargeback, is set forth in U.C.C. section 4-212 (1978).
This right may be exercised by the depositary bank against its customer (the payee) even if the
bank has allowed the customer to draw on those funds. See id. § 4-212(4). The ease with which
chargeback can be exercised is, of course, affected by allowing the customer use of this
provisional credit. The right of chargeback expires upon final settlement. Id. § 4-212(1).
46. See id. §§ 3-507, 3-510 and the accompanying comments.
47. If there are no intermediary banks involved, this is the payor bank. If the depositary
bank and the payor bank are located in the same city they will most likely meet to exchange
checks, often through a local clearing house. See R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 15,
at 102-04. In addition, a depositary bank can send the check directly to the payor bank. This
method of bank collection, is termed "direct send." Id. at 107-08.
48. The U.C.C. defines "presenting bank" as "any bank presenting an item except a
payor bank." U.C.C. § 4-105(e)(1978).
49. Id. § 4-302(a).
50. The Expedited Funds Availability Act: Hearing on H.R. 5301 Before the Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1985) (statement of Rep. Thomas R.
Carper) [hereinafter 1985 Hearing]; Complaints Focus Attention on Bank Delays, 42 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 926 (Apr. 21, 1984).
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magnetically encoded on the check using Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
(MICR). 51 The item is then electronically processed by the use of reader/
sorters. Little, if any, manual processing of the item occurs. The trip to the
payor bank is, therefore, relatively quick.52 Provisional credit is generally
received within two to three days."
If the payor bank decides to pay the item, it will debit the account of the
drawer and remit payment to the presenting bank. In reality, no money
typically will change hands. All is accomplished by way of bookkeeping
entries. Final payment can be accomplished in one of several ways,54 the
most common of which occurs when the payor bank, after making a pro-
visional settlement, fails to revoke the settlement within the time permitted
by statute or clearing house rule. The U.C.C. provides55 that this applicable
time limit is the midnight deadline. 6 Thus, final payment typically is made
when the payor bank fails to dishonor the item by its midnight deadline."
51. See Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 349, 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); B. CLARK, supra note 31, § 10.5, at 10-8; N. PENNY & D. BAKER, THE LAW
OF EIacTRoNIc FuND TRANSFER SYSTEMS § 1.02, at 1-19 to 1-29 (1980).
52. It has been suggested that the speed of the forward process of a check is due to each
bank's financial incentive. As each bank forwaids the item it receives a provisional credit that
may be used for investment and reserve requirements. See Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1128.
53. 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 47 (statement of Sen. Alfonse D'Amato); Cooper,
supra note 8, at 42. In fact, by the provisions of the availability schedules of the Federal
Reserve, the provisional credit will be available in a maximum of 2 days. Baxter & Patrikis,
supra note 3, at 116-17; Jordan, supra note 2, at 527-28. The average time for collection is 1.9
days with approximately 8007 of checks presented one day after deposit. Wechsler, supra note
4, at 1130 (citing AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE & FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, A QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE CHECK COLLECTION SYSTEM 161 (1981)).
54. U.C.C. § 4-213 provides:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the
following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and
without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or
(d) made provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement
in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule or agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraph (b), (c), or (d) the payor bank shall be accountable
for the amount of the item. U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(1978). See id. § 4-302.
55. See U.C.C. § 4-302(a) (1978). The payor bank is accountable for any item that it
has not paid or returned before the bank's midnight deadline, regardless of whether it has
made a provisional settlement for the item. This is termed the undue retention doctrine. For
the history of the undue retention doctrine, see Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555
S.W.2d 589, 598-99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). See generally Note, Retention of Check: Payor Bank's
Liability Under Section 4-302, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 116 (1968) (tracing the derivation
of section 4-302 and analyzing its effectiveness).
56. The U.C.C. defines the "midnight deadline" as "midnight on its next banking day
following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item. ... Id. § 4-104(h).
57. Member banks of a clearing house can allow themselves additional time. Id. § 4-
103(2). See id. § 4-213 comment 4.
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The event of final payment operates as the turn-around point in the bank
collection process. At this point all provisional settlements become final and
the right of reversal or chargeback is lost."
The process differs, however, when the payor bank decides to dishonor59
the item and revoke the provisional settlements. Upon receipt of the check 60
and notice of dishonor, the intermediary and depositary banks similarly
revoke all provisional settlements given."' In contrast to the swift, comput-
erized route to the payor bank, the return trip of a dishonored check is
accomplished manually in an extremely time consuming fashion. 62 At each
stage, bank clerks physically handle the item. Banks do not use electronic
equipment to speed the process. 63 Each bank in the chain need only pass the
check up the chain by its midnight deadline64 to avoid liability. Although
the use of couriers is common to transfer a check toward the payor bank,
the United States mail is the most commonly used means for the return
trip.6" Although the actual length of the trip varies, it is estimated that the
return trip takes, at a minimum, twice as long as the forward trip. It is not
common for the return trip to take three or four times as long as the forward
trip. 66
The delay by the depositary bank in making collected funds available to
its customer is caused by a reluctance on the part of the depositary bank to
allow the customer to draw upon deposited funds until it is certain that final
payment has occurred, that all provisional settlements have become final,
and that there is no danger of chargeback by the intermediary or payor
banks. Unfortunately, the depositary bank typically has no way of knowing
when final payment has occurred. Only if the payor bank actually dishonors
the item will the collecting banks receive any notice. 67 No notice is sent to
58. Id. § 4-212(1).
59. Most checks are dishonored due to insufficient funds, stop payment order, closed
account, missing indorsement, irregular signature, or because the check was drawn on uncollected
funds. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF EXCEPTION ITEMS ON THE CHECK
COLLECTION SYSTEM 24 (1974).
60. The payor bank may send written notice of the dishonor only if unable to physically
return the check. U.C.C. § 4-301(1) (1978). See, e.g., Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co.,
555 S.W.2d 589, 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Midland Nat'l Bank,
96 Wis. 2d 155, 163, 292 N.W.2d 591, 596 (1980). This is important when considering proposals
to shorten the period of delayed availability. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
61. U.C.C. § 4-212(1) (1977).
62. 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 159 (statement of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the
Currency). It has been suggested that, in contrast to financial incentives that encourage speed
in the forward trip, there is no incentive encouraging speed in the return trip. See supra note
52; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1133.
63. See generally BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 59; see also Jordan, supra
note 2, at 532; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1133-35.
64. U.C.C. § 4-212(1) (1977).
65. Jordan, supra note 2, at 519, 527; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1134.
66. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1137.
67. It has been said in this regard: "No news is good news." Id. at 1140.
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verify final payment. 6 Therefore, the depositary bank typically assumes that
final payment has occurred when sufficient time has passed within which
notice of dishonor would have been received. Because of delays inherent in
the bank collection process, in particular the return of dishonored items,
this period of time can be substantial.
69
IV. THE DEBATE
A. Arguments in Favor of Existing Hold Periods
Those who favor existing hold periods70 frequently assert that they are
necessary to prevent a loss to the depositary bank in the event that the
deposited check is subsequently dishonored. A potential for loss arises from
the nature of the bank collection process, in particular from the method by
which dishonored checks are returned. 7' The fear, of course, is' that the
depositary bank will allow its customer to withdraw the deposited funds, the
deposited check will be dishonored, and the bank will be unable to recover
the funds from its customer. In addition to the very real fear of loss from
typical returned checks, 72 banks cite losses from fraud73  or check
68. Considering the sheer number of checks cleared annually, compared with the number
of checks dishonored annually, it makes more sense to send notice only when the unusual
occurs and the check is not paid.
69. There is evidence to suggest that a large number of items are returned after the
expiration of the hold period despite the rather substantial hold periods imposed by most banks.
Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1178-79.
70. Those in favor of the existing hold periods are primarily banking institutions and
federal regulators. That the position taken by bank regulators consistently mirrors that of the
industry is seen as curious by at least one commentator. See Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1160.
Bank regulators clearly are unsympathetic to consumer complaints to the extent that it has been
suggested "that the relationship is akin to 'putting the arsonist in charge of the fire depart-
ment."' Id. at 1161 n.258 (citing Fair Deposit Availability Act: Hearing on S.573 Before the
Subcom. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1983) (testimony of G. Essary, People Inc., Flushing, N.Y.)).
71. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
73. It has been asserted that "the criminal world understands the vulnerability of the
check collection system and is prepared to exploit that vulnerability." Baxter & Patrikis, supra
note 3, at 120. (Both Mr. Baxter and Mr. Patrikis are counsel for the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York). There have been a number of fraud cases involving intentional alteration of the
MICR encoding on a check to delay the check's progress in the check collection system. See,
e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 590 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), reh'g denied, 620 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In this case a customer deposited a
check with a MICR number that did not match the routing symbol. This resulted in the check
being routed aimlessly from bank to bank in search of the payor. After expiration of the ten
day hold period, the depositary bank allowed the customer to withdraw $755,000 against the
check. It was only after the withdrawal that the notice of dishonor was received. See also
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kiting7 ' which might result without hold periods" as a major justification
for the such periods. While these are very real concerns, substantial delayed
funds availability is an inappropriate response. The merits of this conten-
tion will be evaluated below.16
Proponents of hold periods also assert that any unfairness which might
result from holds77 is mitigated because many banks credit interest to cus-
tomers who hold interest bearing accounts from the time of the deposit
rather than from the time of the availability of the funds. This argument is
flawed in several respects. First, not all consumers have interest-bearing
accounts. When the account is not interest-bearing, the depositary bank has
absolutely interest-free use of the funds during the availability delay.78 Sec-
ond, even when the account is interest bearing, the amount of interest
typically paid is substantially less than the interest rate at which the bank is
able to invest those funds. The result is low-interest use of the funds. 79 The
distinction is meaningful when one considers that customers do not consent
to the use of their funds by the bank.80
B. Arguments Against Existing Hold Periods
Opponents of hold periods assert that lengthy hold periods adversely affect
bank customers. Numerous "horror stories" of consumer hardship caused
Northpark Nat'l Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 572 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (another
example of extending the float).
74. Check kiting is a crime by which perpetrators in effect "play the float" to "create"
money. They open two bank accounts in distant locations. Then they write a worthless check
drawn on the bank at Point A and deposit it in a bank at Point B. They similarly write a
check drawn on the bank at Point B and deposit it in the bank at Point A. This will be used
to "cover" the first check written. They continue in this fashion making a series of deposits
that create the impression of substantial balances. When one bank allows withdrawal of the
funds, the kite has been successful and "when the smoke clears" the bank that allowed the
withdrawal will be left "holding the bag." See generally Jordan, supra note 2, at 544 (description
of how kiting schemes operate).
75. The fear of loss from check fraud is cited most frequently as a justification for
substantial hold periods. Jordan, supra note 2, at 544; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1141 nn.123-
32 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 97-127 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
79. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1159.
80. The depositor might be said to have consented to the use of his funds in this manner.
Notice of the hold periods on signature cards or deposit slips or notice posted in the bank can
be construed to constitute an agreement to those terms on the part of the customer. Such
agreements will be enforced under the terms of U.C.C. section 4-103(1). This includes Federal
Reserve regulations, operating letters, and clearing house rules, even without customer assent.
In addition, section 1-201(3) includes common banking practices within the definition of an
agreement even without express customer assent. One case partly relied on this rationale to
deny customers' objections to excessive hold periods. Rapp v. Dime Savings Bank, 64 A.D.2d
964, 408 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1978), afl'd, 48 N.Y.2d 658, 396 N.E.2d 740 (1979). See infra notes
130-33 and accompanying text.
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by delayed availability have been recounted."' Consumers often need im-
mediate access to their funds to pay their bills. Delayed access to funds has
been cited as a common cause of dishonored checks. 2 This might occur
where a consumer deposits his tax refund check into his account on Monday.
Although the consumer may not be informed of a delay, the depositary
bank routinely imposes a seven day hold on all deposited checks. On Tuesday,
the consumer writes a check making his mortgage payment relying upon the
funds deposited the day before. The mortgage payment is presented for
payment on Thursday and dishonored for insufficient funds. 3 The consumer
is outraged, he has suffered embarrassment, 4 his credit rating has been
adversely affected, 5 and his bank probably will assess his account a charge
for the "bounced" check.86 He may even be forced to pay his mortgage
company an extra fee, either for the dishonored check or for a late charge.
The hardship imposed by hold periods impacts disproportionately on small
businesses 7 and consumers. Large businesses are much more likely to use
wholesale electronic funds transfers without delayed availability problems.88
Individuals and small businesses have not shown the same enthusiasm for
81. Reports of so called horror stories abound. They include stories of customers who
have holds imposed on social security checks and reports of 15 day hold periods imposed upon
cashier checks. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1985). Even more alarming
stories have been recounted. Mrs. Lucy Cody of Boston deposited $1,413.45 into her account.
All but about $400 of the deposit was in cash. The depositary bank imposed a two week hold
on the entire deposit, including the cash portion. Mrs. Cody did not discover this until the
checks she had written upon the deposit were dishonored. Id. at 13. Even more persuasive is
the story of a man who deposited a check for $5000 into his account. After a $50 withdrawal
was refused, the customer discovered that the bank not only had placed a ten day hold upon
the deposited check, but had imposed the hold upon the entire account. Id.
82. See supra note 59.
83. It is not considered wrongful dishonor under U.C.C. section 4-402 for a bank to
dishonor a check drawn on credits that were not yet available. See, e.g., Merchant v. Worley,
79 N.M. 771, 449 P.2d 787 (1969); Dow, Damages and Proof in Cases of Wrongful Dishonor:
The Unsettled Issues Under UCC Section 4-402, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 237, 237 n.4 (1985).
84. 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 32 (statement by Rep. Carper).
85. Id. at 33.
86. It is estimated that approximately $3.4 billion per year is assessed in service charges
for returned checks. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985). Typical fees imposed
for dishonor due to insufficient funds vary from $2 to $6 with a $4 charge average. BANK
ADMNISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 28. Overdraft charges have been reported as high
as $30 per check. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985).
87. In addition to the hardship stemming from delayed availability described in the text,
small businesses also face problems stemming from the delay in check collection. A business
accepting checks (as payee) might suffer loss where it relinquishes possession of merchandise
in exchange for a check. Before the business receives notice of the dishonor, the purchaser has
received and used the merchandise.
88. Jordan, supra note 2, at 517. See also Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the
Uniform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664 (1983) (average wire transfer is $2
million compared with the average check in the amount of $570).
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electronic funds transfers.8 9 Further, the depositor who maintains a large
balance in his account typically suffers less from the imposition of hold
periods. This is true both because the bank is more likely to waive9° hold
periods for wealthy depositors,9 and because one who maintains a large
balance is less likely to rely on the last deposit made for the checks written.
Consumers' complaints are aggravated by the fact that banks typically
have access to deposited funds before expiration of the hold periods. Often
banks gain access to the funds in accordance with the Federal Reserve
availability schedules. Under these timetables, the longest wait for access to
funds is two days. 92 When a bank is given a provisional credit before final
payment, it is, in effect, given an interest-free loan by the Federal Reserve
financed at the government's expense. 93 Further, after collection, the interest-
free loan continues at the customer's expense until the funds are available
for use. 94 This creates a financial incentive for the collecting bank to delay
availability. Consumers argue that collecting banks are able to make sub-
stantial profits by using this float. 95
In addition, the depositary bank is able to count funds provisionally
credited to its account by the Federal Reserve towards its reserve accounts,
even though the funds have not yet been made available to its customer.
96
This might provide additional incentive to delay availability.
89. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, CHECKING ACCOUNT USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
xiii, 137-38 (1979). See also Fox, Another Step Toward the Cashless Society? The 1978 Federal
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 209 (1980). Part of this might be due to the
fact that electronic funds transfers might be unavailable to the consumer. For example, if one's
employer does not offer the option of direct deposit of the payroll check (a form of electronic
funds transfer (EFT)), then the consumer can hardly be faulted for not embracing EFTs. In
fact, the major electronic fund transfer systems currently in use are not available for use by
individual depositors. This would include Fed Wire (inter-bank transfers within the Federal
Reserve System), Bank Wire (service for private-sector banks), and Clearing House Interbank
Payment System (available to participating New York City banks). See generally N. PENNY &
D. BAKER, supra note 51, §§ 9.01-9.04, at 9-1 to 9-14 (thorough discussion of electronic fund
systems).
90. It is quite common for hold periods to be waived. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
91. The depositary bank might waive its hold periods where the risk to be incurred in
the event of dishonor is minimal. Because the depositary bank always has the right to chargeback
its customer's account in the event of dishonor, the bank might feel more comfortable allowing
early access to funds where it reasonably believes that the depositor has the ability to reimburse
the bank for the funds in the event chargeback becomes necessary. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
92. See supra note 3 and acconipanying text.
93. Baxter & Patrikis, supra note 3, at 116-17. This loan might no longer be considered
interest-free because the Federal Reserve now charges a fee for collection of checks through
the system. This was established by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1982)). E. COMPTON, supra note 15, at 38.
94. Baxter & Patrikis, supra note 3, at 117.
95. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
96. Cooper, supra note 2, at 534.
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While advocates of change recognize that banks have a legitimate interest
in protecting themselves from the risk of loss from returfned checks, 97 the
actual risk of bank loss is minimal. 9 Although a significant number of
checks are returned daily, 99 returned checks account for less than one percent
of the checks deposited for collection.100 In addition, one-half of these
returned items are paid upon second presentment. 101 Perhaps more relevant
to a discussion of the risk of loss from such checks is a consideration of
the dollar value involved in return items. Sixty-three percent of those checks
returned are for amounts of less than $100.10 While checks in amounts
greater than $2,500 account for only two percent of all returned checks,
they account for fifty percent of the dollar value of all returned checks. 03
The depositary bank does not suffer a loss every time a check is returned.
The depositary bank is permitted by law to recover the amount of any
returned check from its customer. It can do this either under the contract
of deposit with its customer, or under U.C.C. provisions for indorser's
contract,'0 warranty,0 5 or chargeback.' ° The depositary bank's rights in this
regard are not diminished if the bank allows its customer to draw on the
deposited, uncollected funds. Therefore, the fear of the depositary bank is
twofold: 1) the bank fears that the item will ultimately be dishonored; and
2) the bank fears that it will be unable to recover the amount of the item
from its customer through chargeback.0 7 Only when both situations exist
will the depositary bank suffer any loss. The availability of recovery from
97. Id. at 536.
98. The risk of loss for returned items is estimated at $0.02 per check. BANx ADMMIS-
TRATION INsTrrUTE, supra note 59; Cooper, supra note 2, at 537. Total bank loss from returned
checks totalled only $5 million in 1974. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at
25.
99. While complete statistics are unavailable, the Federal Reserve estimates that 360
million checks were returned through the Federal Reserve in 1981 . This represents one percent
of the checks collected through the Federal Reserve. Cooper, supra note 2, at 535. This can
represent a significant amount of checks for any given bank. Approximately 4,000 checks are
returned daily to Citibank. Baxter & Patrikis, supra note 3, at 120 n.123.
100. 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 159 (statement of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the
Currency); Id. at 213 (Joint Policy Statement on Delayed Availability of Funds (citing 1981
Bank Administration Institute Survey and the Federal Reserve System)); Cooper, supra note 2,
at 535. The actual return rate is estimated to be approximately 0.67% of the checks processed.
BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 23-29; Jordan, supra note 2, at 532 n.87.
101. Cooper, supra note 2, at 537.
102. Id. at 537.
103. Cooper, supra note 2, at 536.
104. U.C.C. § 3-414 (1978).
105. See id. § 4-207.
106. See id. § 4-212.
107. While statistics can be found listing the number of items dishonored annually, see
supra note 99, no statistics have been found that describe what percentage of this is not
recoverable through chargeback from the customer. It has been stated without support that the
vast majority of dishonored checks are recovered from the customer either through subsequent
deposit or chargeback. Cooper, supra note 2, at 537.
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its customer minimizes the potential for loss from an already unlikely
dishonor and is rarely addressed in established hold periods.
Further, while lengthy hold periods are likely to minimize the risk of
certain types of losses, they will have little or no effect on other types of
potential losses. The depositary bank fears that the item will be dishonored,
either due to credit considerations such as insufficient funds, no account,
or stop payment orders,108 or due to fraud such as forged endorsements,
forged drawer's signature, material alteration, or check kiting.1" 9 Imposition
of lengthy hold periods are unlikely to reduce losses due to certain instances
of fraud. Many instances of fraud, such as material alteration or forged
endorsements, are generally discovered long after final payment." 0 Hold
periods will not offer the depositary bank any protection. In such situations,
following expiration of established hold periods, the depositary bank will
allow its customer access to the deposited funds. Following discovery by the
payor bank of the fraud, the payor bank is able to pass the loss up the
chain, under breach of warranty, " ' to the depositary bank. Thus, even after
final payment the depositary bank will ultimately bear the loss in spite of
delayed hold periods.11 2
Moreover, while hold periods are of some value in the prevention of check
kiting and losses due to forged drawer's signature," 3 the depositary bank is
108. This has been termed the credit-risk loss. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 533. Credit-
risk loss is discussed supra note 9.
109. This has been termed the fraud-risk loss. Cooper, supra note 2, at 533.
110. Id. at 538. One study suggests that current hold periods are, in fact, inadequate to
provide depositary banks with maximum protection. Id. at 538 n.23.
11. See U.C.C. § 4-207(1) (1977).
112. For example, assume that Frank Forger forged his indorsement on a check made out
to Pete Payee and deposited it in his account with the Depositary National Bank. The check
was forwarded for collection and subsequently paid by the Payor National Bank. When Pete
discovered that the check had been stolen, he contacted Dan Drawer, who subsequently contacted
the Payor National Bank. Payor National is able to pass the loss up the chain under breach
of warranty principles. See id. § 4-207. The Depositary Bank clearly breached the warranty of
good title, and the warranty of genuine signatures. Id. at § 4-207(2)(a)-(b). Under such principles,
the loss generally rests upon the first party who dealt with the forger, in this case the Depositary
National Bank. See, e.g., Payroll Check Cashing v. New Palestine Bank, 401 N.E.2d 752 (Ind.
App. 1980); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Hammond, 298 N.C. 703, 260 S.E.2d 617 (1979);
Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 548 P.2d 563 (1976); see Note,
Allocation of Liability for Checks Bearing Unauthorized Endorsements and Unauthorized
Drawer's Signatures, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1077 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Allocation]. Thus,
unless the customer is the person who dealt with the forger, rather than the forger himself, the
depositary bank will bear the loss in spite of the availability delay.
113. Hold periods would only work to reduce loss in the event of forged drawer's signature
where the payor bank discovered the forgery before final payment and dishonored the item.
Where the payor bank paid the item in spite of the forgery, the payor bank would bear the
loss under the rule of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762) (codified at
U.C.C. § 3-418). See, e.g., Payroll Check Cashing v. New Palestine Bank, 401 N.E.2d 752,
754-55 (Ind. App. 1980); see also Dow & Ellis, supra note 15, at 406; Note, Allocation, supra
note 112, at 1079, 1081.
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better situated to prevent loss due to such frauds. ' ' 4 Such loss might be
prevented by careful verification. The bank is in an excellent position to
examine the item" ' and the customer.
16
On the other hand, hold periods are an ineffective way of preventing
losses due to credit inadequacies. If the drawer's account has insufficient
funds or a stop payment order has been issued, the item will be dishonored
before the funds have been made available to the customer with no resulting
loss to the depositary bank. This is of particular significance because eighty-
one percent of all items dishonored are dishonored as a result of credit
inadequacies." 7 Furthermore, unlike the above situation involving fraud, the
depositary bank cannot determine in advance whether any given check might
be returned because of credit inadequacies through item verification." '
Nevertheless, the blanket holds imposed by many banks do not legitimately
address this concern. First, there are several categories of checks upon which
holds are routinely placed ' 9 where there is little or no risk of credit inade-
quacy. For example, government checks (state, federal, or local), 20 certified
checks,' 2' cashier checks, 122 and, to a lesser extent, payroll or dividend checks
impose virtually no risk of dishonor due to credit inadequacies. Second,
even where the depositary bank cannot examine a given item and determine
its likelihood of dishonor due to credit inadequacies, it can make some
determination with respect to the creditworthiness of its customer, the de-
positor.1'2 In fact, banks typically recognize this factor, at least in practice.
114. Those who favor delayed availability frequently cite the fear of check kiting as a
major justification for hold periods. It is clear that the potential loss for a bank from just one
major check kiting scheme is enormous; larger than the capital reserves of many banks. Jordan,
supra note 2, at 552. However, this argument overlooks two important points. First, banks are
insured against losses from check kiting schemes. Thus, a loss would merely increase the cost
of doing business by the cost of the additional premiums to cover the insurance. These costs
are passed on to the customers. Second, and perhaps more important, better methods are
currently available to prevent check kiting schemes. Banks commonly utilize basic security
measures to screen suspected accounts and to detect kiting. B. CLAsU, supra note 31, § 4.12,
at 4-18-20 (Cum. Supp. 1983); Jordan, supra note 2, at 544.
115. The bank could examine the item to determine the validity of the endorsements or
obvious material alterations.
116. This is particularly useful when the customer is the perpetrator of the fraud. However,
where the customer is the victim of the fraud, the bank is usually in an ideal position to pass
the loss to the customer. Cooper, supra note 2, at 545.
117. Cooper, supra note 2, at 542. See BANK ADMINISTRAUON INsTrruTE, supra note 59,
at 25.
118. Cooper, supra note 2, at 542.
119. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1153-54.
120. There are numerous reports of holds placed upon IRS tax refund checks and social
security checks.
121. A certified check is a check that has been accepted by the payor. This makes the
payor the primary obligor. See U.C.C. §§ 3-411, 3-413. Therefore, dishonor is unlikely.
122. A cashier's check is drawn by a bank on itself, the bank is both drawer and drawee.
E. COMPTON, supra note 15, at 66.
123. This is relevant because it is only when the check is dishonored and the bank cannot
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It is common for banks to waive the availability hold periods 2 4 where the
bank is confident that the customer will be able to reimburse the depositary
bank for any loss in the event of dishonor. '25 Rather than mitigating the
harshness of lengthy hold periods, frequent waivers add to the confusion
and the inequity. Hold periods should be limited to those situations where
holds would legitimately further the interests meant to be protected, rather
than imposing blanket hold periods with frequent'2 6 waivers.2 7
There is no doubt that dishonor of an item after funds have been made
available to a depositor poses very real risks that legitimately concern bank-
ers. Admittedly these risks can be addressed, to some extent, by delayed
availability of funds. However, the lengthy blanket hold periods routinely
imposed by many banks'28 are an inappropriate way of minimizing these
risks. The imposition of lengthy hold periods attempts to address these risks
at the expense of consumers and small businesses. Furthermore, delaying
availability of funds on items where there is either very little risk of dishonor,
little risk of loss due to the availability of the right to chargeback, or a more
effective way to reduce the risk of loss is overbroad in its application.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Case Law
If one accepts the premise that the current practice of delayed availability
of funds is unfair and should be either abolished or modified, the next
question to be addressed is how this goal should be accomplished. One of
the first approaches customers took to force banks to shorten the hold
recover the amount of the item from its customer that the depositary bank faces any losses.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
124. Cooper, supra note 2, at 541-44; Jordan, supra note 2, at 534. But see Wechsler,
supra note 4, at 1146-47 n.162.
125. Sometimes this can be dangerous also. Consistent waiver of the availability periods
by bank officials allowed E.F. Hutton to perpetrate a massive check kiting scheme. Wall St.
J., May 6, 1985, at 3, col.2. See also Jordan, supra note 2, at 545 n.158.
126. While hold periods are frequently waived, the basis upon which any decision to waive
hold periods is made is unclear and largely a question of business judgment. This makes it very
difficult to predict whether or not holds will be placed upon a particular deposit.
127. One commentator suggests that hold periods are justified in very limited circum-
stances:
1. Where there is an identifiable credit risk that the bank cannot reasonably
assume the customer will be able or available to reabsorb; or
2. Where there is a fraud risk that the bank, in its dealings with the item, cannot
determine prior to deposit and that the bank cannot reasonably assume that the
customer will be able or available to absorb the loss.
Cooper, supra note 2, at 546.
128. Not all banks routinely impose the blanket holds that are the subject of this paper.
In fact, studies have shown that blanket holds are uncommon in small cities where banks are
likely to know their customers. Cooper, supra note 2, at 541.
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periods was to turn to the courts for help. The cases focus on the question
of the "reasonableness" of the hold period imposed. 29 In Rapp v. Dime
Savings Bank, 30 the plaintiff asserted that a hold period of six days on local
checks and fifteen days on out-of-town checks was unreasonable. The court
disagreed, holding that the period was part of an agreement' between the
bank and its customer which was enforceable under U.C.C. section 4-
103(l).132 In finding the agreement enforceable, the court found that it was
neither manifestly unreasonable nor inconsistent with the exercise of ordinary
care. "'33 Further, it appears likely that courts might approve hold periods
without evidence of an agreement. 34 In fact, the court in Discount Auto
Mart v. Bank of North Carolina3 5 found that a depositary bank's right to
impose hold periods exists without regard to an agreement creating the hold
period.
Depositor court challenges to hold periods have usually been unsuccess-
ful. 3 6 However, alternative solutions have been proposed to alleviate the
adverse consequences suffered by consumer depositors.
129. Recall that the bank must make a depositor's funds available for a "reasonable"
period of time after final payment occurs. U.C.C. § 4-213(4)(a) (1977). The drafters' comments
to the section make clear that a determination of what constitutes a reasonable amount of time
will depend upon the distance the item has to travel, the number of intermediary banks, the
successive midnight deadlines of each bank and other pertinent facts. Id. § 4-213 comment 10;
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
130. 64 A.D.2d 964, 408 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 658, 396 N.E.2d 740,
421 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1979).
131. The bank's availability policies were printed on the back of deposit slips and posted
in each branch. The court found that the customer impliedly consented to the terms of the
agreement by opening an account and by depositing his check. It has been asserted that this
analysis overlooks the fact that the agreement referred to in the case is, at best, a contract of
adhesion in which the bank customer has little or no actual choice or opportunity to agree to
the terms. Jordan, supra note 2, at 549 n.178. This argument is recognized if not sanctioned
in Baxter & Patrikis, supra note 3, at 124 n.147.
132. U.C.C. § 4-103(1) (1978).
133. Id. § 4-213(1). These are the only two grounds under which an agreement by the
bank will not be enforced. In enforcing the agreement the court noted that the terms of the
hold period were printed on the back of the deposit slip as well as posted in the bank office.
Further, the court noted that the basic purpose of check holds is to "protect the bank and,
indirectly, the bank's depositors, against making payments, via withdrawals, on deposited
checks which prove to be uncollectible." Rapp v. Dime Savings Bank, 64 A.D.2d 964, 408
N.Y.S.2d 540, 543 (1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 658, 396 N.E.2d 740, 421 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1979).
134. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1147. The court in Discount Auto Mart v. Bank of North
Carolina, 45 N.C. App. 543, 263 S.E.2d 41 (1980), while faced with a slightly different question,
upheld the bank's right to impose hold periods without the necessity of an agreement.
135. 45 N.C. App. 543, 263 S.E.2d 41 (1980).
136. No reported case can be found in which a plaintiff successfully convinced a court to
shorten or abolish the hold periods. However, there have been several cases in which banks
entered into settlements with the plaintiff customers. In Chadwick v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, Civ.
No. 792521 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 1983), class action plaintiffs alleged that defendant placed
an unreasonably long hold on deposited checks and failed to adequately disclose its policy.
Although Chadwick contended that the plaintiffs could not have prevailed on the merits,
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B. Disclosure
One of the first suggested solutions, and the solution advocated by bankers
and the Federal Reserve Board, 3 7 is disclosure of the delay period.3  Studies
have demonstrated that the majority of consumer complaints cite lack of
disclosure as a major source of problem.3 9 Therefore, early in the debate
surrounding delayed availability of funds, bankers advocated voluntary pro-
grams of disclosure as a solution to the problem. 140 They also argued that
disclosure would minimize any hardship occasioned by delay periods and
would encourage banking institutions to work toward ultimate voluntary
solutions. With disclosure, it was thought, an institution's hold policies could
form the basis of an informed consumer's choice among institutions. Market
competition itself would assert pressure for change.' 41 A number of states,
agreeing with the validity of these arguments, have adopted statutes man-
Crocker not only agreed to shorten its delay period, see Jordan, supra note 2, at 546 n.162,
but also awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees of $140,000. Uncollected Funds-A Costly Quagmire,
BANKERS NEWS WEEKLY (Jan. 10, 1984).
A settlement was also reached in Ricketts v. Lloyds Bank of Cal., No. 343769 (L.A.
Super. Ct. 1983). The parties agreed to a one day reduction in the hold period and specified
more complete disclosure. Jordan, supra note 2, at 546 n.162. See Wechsler, supra note 4, at
1148 n.172.
The confusion in the courts' treatment of this issue is aggravated by a surprising decision
from the Fourth Circuit in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of Bladenboro, 596 F.2d 632 (4th
Cir. 1979). Concerned about the overdraft condition of its depositor's account, the depositary
bank imposed a ten day hold period. The hold period was never observed and the depositary
bank continued to pay against uncollected items until it received notice of dishonor. Upon
dishonor, the insurer of the depositary bank sued various collecting banks alleging negligence
in the collection process and in advising the depositary bank of the dishonor. The court found
the depositary bank to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law for allowing its customer
to draw on deposited funds before the hold period expired. In this case the depositary bank
failed to observe an established hold period. The effect of this decision on shortening or
eliminating hold periods is unclear.
137. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1985) (statement of P. Martin); Delayed
Availability is Arousing Interest, 3 BANKING EXPANSION REP. 4 (Mar. 5, 1984); Should Gov-
ernment Say When You Make Funds Available?, A.B.A. BANKING J. 140 (Mar. 1984).
138. See, e.g., 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 320, 337 (ARCB Special Report); Id. at
157 (statement of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the Currency); Lieberman, Fed Requests
Disclosure of Float Policies, 149 AM. BANKER 1 (Feb. 16, 1984); Moyer, Tell Customers Why
Checks Aren't Instant Cash, 75 A.B.A. BANKING J. 240 (May 1983); Regulating Policies on
Funds Availability Unnecessary, 3 BANKERS NEWS WEEKLY 4 (Oct. 9, 1984); Sample Statements
Offered on Delayed Availability, 2 BANKERS NEWS WEEKLY 1, col. 2 (Aug. 16, 1983).
139. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
140. Ballen, There Are No Easy Solutions to the Delayed Availability Problem, 6 NAT'L
L.J. 15 (1984); Olson, Procedures for Float Disclosure Need Uniformity, 149 AM. BANKER 4
(Aug. 16, 1984); Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1165-66; How to Avoid Customer Confusion Over
Funds Availability, 13 BANK OPERATIONS REP. 1 (Jan. 15, 1984); Sample Statements Offered
on Delayed Availability, 2 BANKERS NEWS WEEKLY 1, col. 2 (Aug. 16, 1983).
141. See, e.g., 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 160-61 (statement of C.T. Conover,
Comptroller of the Currency),
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dating the disclosure of delayed availability schedules.'4 2 In addition, statu-
torily mandated disclosure is an important component of every legislative
proposal. 143
There are several problems with embracing disclosure as the panacea to
the problem of delayed availability of funds. Banks have increasingly dis-
closed delayed availability policies, but consumer dissatisfaction has actually
risen slightly." Thus, if disclosure is meant to alleviate consumer complaints,
it has not been successful. More importantly, if delayed availability is unfair
to the consumer-depositor, disclosure of the unfairness does not make it any
less unfair.' 4 While advance notice of bank policies might eliminate some
of the inconveniences associated with hold periods, there is no escaping the
inequities stemming from bank use of customer funds with virtually no
alternative for the customer.' 46
C. Legislated Availability Schedules
An alternative approach to the problem of delayed access to funds is the
establishment of fixed availability schedules. Legislation establishing such
schedules generally places specific limits on the number of days that the
depositary institution can hold an item for various categories of checks. New
York and California were among the first states to adopt statutes mandating
availability. 47 While it is not the intent of this Article to describe the specifics
of all statutes concerning delayed availability, a discussion of some common
provisions in these two statutes will prove useful. Both states amended
U.C.C. section 4-213(4)(a) and required that regulators specify what is a
"reasonable" amount of time to delay availability as of right. 48 The specifics
142. Connecticut's statute originally was limited to mandated disclosure. 1984 Conn. Pub.
Acts 84-164 (Reg. Sess.). Subsequently the legislature amended the statute mandating fixed
availability schedules. 1985 Conn. Pub. Acts 85-194 § (a) (Reg. Sess.). Delaware includes in its
rather unique statute provisions for mandated disclosure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 937 (1975)
(amended 1984). Florida requires written notice before an account is opened and the notice
must be posted at each branch. FLA. STAT. § 655.081 (1984). Maryland requires disclosure in
writing when the account is opened and at a customer's demand. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN.
§ 5-309 (Supp. 1984).
143. See infra notes 147 & 157 and accompanying text.
144. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985).
145. For an excellent discussion of the inadequacies of disclosure as a solution, see
Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1164-67.
146. In most communities there is little difference among banks with respect to delayed
availability schedules. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1167.
147. Assembly Bill No. 1723, Cal. Legis., ch. 1011, 1983-1984 Regular Session; Laws of
New York, ch. 234, 1983 Regular Session. Other states that now have adopted fixed availability
schedules include Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 1984 Legislative Service ch. 390 (West
1985), and Connecticut, 1985 Conn. Pub. Acts 85-194 § (a) (Reg. Sess.).
Fixed availability schedules are also an integral part of the proposed federal statutes. See
infra notes 190-209 and accompanying text. For a discussion of current legislation in this area,
see Cooper, Checks Held Hostage-Current Legislation on Funds Availability, 103 BANKING
L.J. 4 (1985).
148. Miller, Ballen & Scott, supra note 8, at 1361.
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of these regulations are of interest. First, the regulations provide that funds
from deposited checks must be made available within one business day for
the following items: checks of $100 or less, items drawn on the depositary
bank, first-indorsed items drawn on the United States Treasury or on the
respective state or local governments.1 49 Funds from deposited local checks
(same city) must be made available'50 within two business days."' Depositary
banks have three to four business days to make funds available for intrastate
checks.15 2 There is a slight variation between the states. For example, New
York regulations give depositary banks six business days to make funds
available on out-of-state checks, while California sets the deadline at eight
business days. 53
Second, each state provides certain situations to which the above periods
do not apply. In each of these situations depositary banks are free to set
their own availability schedules:
(1) When checks are drawn for more than $2500;
(2) When an item is deposited within 30 days of the opening of the
depositor's account;
(3) Where the depositor's account has been overdrawn on 3 separate
occasions within the previous 6 months;
(4) Where the depositary bank in good faith doubts the collectability of
the item; and
(5) Where the item is drawn on a bank located outside the United States.'5 4
In addition, both states clearly provide that the time limits do not apply
if the delay in making funds available is caused by circumstances beyond
the control of the depositary bank. This would include circumstances such
as interruption of communication facilities, war or emergency conditions.'55
Further, California regulations provide that the time limits are inapplicable
149. Subarticle 5 of Article 30 of Subchapter 10 of Chapter 1 of Title 10 of the Cal.
Admin. Code, §§ 10.190405 (a)(l), 10.190406 (1984); State of New York, General Regulations
of the Banking Board, pt. 34, § 34.3(a)(4-7)(1983).
150. The maximum periods listed apply to commercial banks. Slightly different periods
are provided for savings banks, and savings and loan institutions. Wechsler, supra note 4, at
1170.
151. Section 10.190405(a)(2) of the California Administrative Code; section 34.3(a)(1) of
the New York Code.
152. Section 10.190405(a)(3)-(4) of the California Administrative Code; section 34.4(a)(2)
of the New York Code. California requires availability of funds in three business days on items
drawn on in-state banks, located in a different city but using the same clearing facility as the
depositary bank. On other in-state checks the depositary bank has four business days to make
the funds available.
153. Section 10.190405(a)(5) of the California Administrative Code; section 34.3(a)(3) of
the New York Code.
154. Section 10.190407(a) of the California Administrative Code; sections 34.4(a)-(e) of
the New York Code.
155. Section 10.190407(c) of the California Administrative Code; section 34.4(g) of the
New York Code.
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where there is a processing delay as in the case of an improperly encoded
item. 156
The major provisions of these statutes will be evaluated because they form
the basis for legislation introduced at the federal level. 15 7 Any statute dealing
with the problem of delayed availability of funds must balance the risk of
loss to banking institutions caused by relatively immediate availability against
the hardship on the customer imposed by delayed availability periods."'s The
question is how well these statutes achieve this balance. At first glance, this
balance appears to have been maintained by accelerating availability while
attempting to limit the risk of loss to banking institutions. However, a closer
examination is warranted.
The first question to be considered is whether the availability of deposits
will be improved to a significant degree. It has been asserted that the
improved availability is largely illusory.'59 This statement is supported by an
examination of the mandated availability schedules. The statutes mandate
availability in business days rather than calendar days. Further, the day of
deposit is not included in the necessary calculations. 160 Thus, although the
statutory scheme appears to provide great improvement, when one compares
pre-statutory practice with the mandated schedules, there has been little
change. 161 For example, conversion of the New York' 62 mandated availability
156. Section 10.190407(a)(5) of the California Administrative Code. This presumably would
exempt deposited checks where an error in encoding makes manual processing necessary. Its
effect upon delays caused by fraudulent encoding is doubtful. In such a situation the depositary
bank would be unable to determine that there was an encoding inconsistency at the time of
deposit. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 590 F.
Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), reh'g denied, 620 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Northpark v.
Bankers Trust, 572 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
157. This has been a topic of federal concern for a number of years. Several bills were
introduced during the Ist Session of the 98th Congress: Fair Deposit Availability Act of 1983,
S. 573, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Financial Services Competitive Equity Act, S. 2181, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Several bills were introduced in the 98th Congress, 2nd Session, including
Title VI, Fair Deposit Availability Act of 1984, S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Two
major bills are under consideration in the 99th Congress: The Expedited Funds Availability
Act, H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., enacted by the House in January 23, 1986 and by the
Senate in October 18, 1986; Fair Deposit Availability Act of 1986, Title X, S. 2592, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). For a discussion of the currently pending bills, see infra notes 181-241
and accompanying text.
158. It has been said that any legislative solution must address only the following problem
areas: 1) the customer's need to know the general hold policy of the institution, 2) the customer's
need to know the hold placed upon a specific item, 3) the need to set maximum hold periods
to prevent unreasonable hold periods, 4) the need to restrict the opportunity to vary the new
law by agreement as the court found in Rapp v. Dime Savings, 5) the problem of check returns,
6) the question of interest during the availability delay, and 7) appropriate penalties for violation.
See Jordan, supra note 2, at 549-50. There is, however, no question that any legislation must
not unreasonably increase the risk of loss from dishonored checks or fraudulent schemes.
159. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1175.
160. CAL. ADMN. CODE tit. 10, ch. 10(l) art. 30(5) §§ 10.190402, 10.190405; State of
New York, General Regulations of the Banking Board, pt. 34, § 34.3.
161. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1175-78.
162. A similar conversion could be accomplished for the California schedules.
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schedules into calendar days reveals that commercial bank funds from local
checks must be available in five calendar days, and for out-of-state checks
the funds must be made available in ten calendar days. This compares with
the pre-statutory practice of median availability of four days for local checks
and nine days for out-of-state checks. 63 The maximum hold periods almost
mirror the median hold periods described. The claim of little actual improve-
ment has been made in reliance upon these statistics.
However, this contention fails to consider the extent to which improvement
exists. While the median hold periods mirror the statutory maximums, studies
reveal substantial deviation from the pre-statutory median. The longest hold
period imposed was eight days for local checks, fifteen days for intrastate
checks, and twenty-two days for out-of-state checks. The results are even
more disparate when the hold periods of savings and loan institutions are
examined. Here, statutes impose maximum hold periods of five calender
days for local checks, compared with a pre-statutory median of eight days
and a high of thirty-nine days; the statute imposes a maximum hold period
of eight business days for in-state checks, compared with a pre-statutory
median of eleven days and a high of forty-six days; the statute imposes a
maximum hold period of twelve business days for out-of-state checks, com-
pared with a pre-statutory median of seventeen days and a high of forty-six
days.' 64 While little difference exists between the maximum mandated hold
periods and the median hold periods found at New York commercial banks,
there is a substantial improvement between the mandated maximums and
the longest hold periods imposed, particularly in the savings and loan
institutions. In light of this, statutes can effectively eliminate the extremes
in treatment.
To a great extent, the improvement in aggregate fund availability has been
achieved without substantial increase of risk of loss to the depositary banks.
First, prior to enactment of the statute the majority of banks imposed hold
periods similar to the maximum hold periods mandated by the statute without
substantial loss from dishonored checks. Furthermore, placing checks into
various categories and establishing different availability schedules for checks
in each category improved availability with minimally increased risk of loss
to the depositary institution. A good example of improved availability is the
requirement that checks of less than one hundred dollars be available by the
day after the deposit. Improved availability can be achieved for a large
number 65 of checks' 6 without significant increased risk. 67 Similarly, next
163. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1176 (citing a survey of New York banks conducted by
the State of New York Banking Department in 1983.)
164. Wechster, supra note 4, at 1176.
165. It has, however, been asserted that the $100 figure might actually be too low to be
effective. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1173 n.348. Because consumers need to obtain cash from
their payroll checks through their checking accounts, and most paychecks presumably are greater
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day availability of checks drawn upon governmental units poses little risk
of loss to depositary institutions.1
6
Moreover, the statutes attempt to exempt from the maximum hold periods
situations where there is a greater than usual risk of loss to the depositary
bank. Although there are slight differences, both California and New York
generally exempt three types of checks from the maximum hold periods:
large deposits, deposits into new accounts, 6 9 deposits drawn outside the
United States,170 and deposits into accounts where there have been repeated
overdrafts. 7' Additionally, depositary banks are permitted to utilize their
own availability schedules if there are good faith doubts with respect to the
collectability of items or where certain specified emergency conditions exist.
The statutes appear to have successfully balanced the need for rapid avail-
ability of funds with the need to protect the depositary banks from unnec-
essary risk of loss. A recent study of the New York banks revealed virtually
no additional losses reported since enactment of the statute.
7 2
Despite the improvements made by these statutes, there is a fundamental
problem with the concept of state regulation. 73 State regulation, by its very
nature, is limited to state boundaries. More importantly, states address the
problem in varying ways, but the vast majority ignore it. Thus, the problem
of delayed availability is being addressed in a very piecemeal fashion. State
regulation can never address the source of the delayed availability problem
- the nature of the check return process. '17 Legislatures can impose maxi-
mum hold periods only on banks chartered in their own states; they cannot
regulate the nature of the national check collection system.
However, it has been suggested that imposition of hold periods without
revising the check collection process, could induce banks to implement the
than $100, the figure might indeed be too low. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note
89, at 65.
166. Seventy-two percent of the total volume of all checks written are for under $100. Id.
at 7.
167. While 72% of all checks written are for less than $100, these account for only 3.1%
of the dollar value of returned checks. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1173.
168. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
169. Checks drawn upon new accounts have an increased risk of being dishonored.
Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1212 n.540. In addition, a large majority of fraud cases were
perpetrated by holders of new accounts. Baxter & Patrikis, supra note 3, at 124-25; Serpico,
Don't Get Stung by New-Accounts Fraud, A.B.A. BANING J. 184 (May 1984).
170. Here, presumably, the turn-around time is expected to be much longer.
171. "Repeated overdrafts" is considered to be three overdrafts within a six month period.
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
172. Sudo, Report: Shorter Check Holding Not Hurting Institutions in NY, 149 AM.
BANKER 2 (Sept. 6, 1984).
173. For an excellent discussion of the deficiencies of state delayed availability regulation,
see Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1180-82.
174. The only true solution to the problem of delayed availability is to change the check
return process. See infra notes 242-81 and accompanying text.
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required changes without further regulation. 17  If the currently adopted
method of check collection becomes infeasible, because of either technolog-
ical change or increased risk imposed by legislative initiative, banks can seek
alternative means of check collection. This suggestion has some merit with
respect to state regulation. 176 However, it does not account for the fact that
banks within a small number of states have little power to change the
national bank collection process.177
D. Proposed Federal Legislation
Because state legislation is inadequate to solve this problem, federal leg-
islation has been proposed during the past several congressional sessions. 17
During the 99th Congress, the House passed the Expedited Funds Availability
Act. 79 The Fair Deposit Availability Act of 1986 was introduced in the
Senate as part of the Deposit Insurance Reform and Competitive Enhance-
ment Act. 80 These two bills have significant differences. This Article will
examine the salient features of each proposal. It will then evaluate the
proposals and offer a recommendation.'
1. The Expedited Funds Availability Act
The Expedited Funds Availability Act (the Act) adopts a three-part ap-
proach to the problem of delayed funds availability. First, the statute directs
175. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1198 n.474, attributing such a general statement to Federal
Reserve Board of Governors member Nancy Teeters.
176. The author cannot help but be persuaded by this argument when considering proposed
federal legislation. See infra notes 181-241 and accompanying text.
177. But see H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1985) (statement of P. Martin,
Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in a letter dated
November 19, 1985 to Rep. Chalmers Wylie):
Uniform nationwide application of mandated availability schedules may well be
unnecessary to deal with what is an essentially localized problem that can be
effectively dealt with at the state level. Several states have already taken the initiative
to adopt such schedules and in view of the local variations of this problem, state
action is probably the most appropriate vehicle for dealing with it.
178. See supra note 157 (partial listing of past and presently proposed federal statutes).
179. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
180. Fair Deposit Availability Act of 1986, Title X of Deposit Insurance Reform and
Competitive Enhancement Act, S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
181. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1986). House Bill 2443 (the Act) begins with
a set of findings and a statement of its purpose that are, in many ways, a summary of the
issue of delayed funds availability. The drafters find that: 1) the writing and deposit of checks
is an important element in the efficient operation of the American economy; 2) many people
rely on the rapid availability of funds for the basic necessities of life; 3) notwithstanding the
fact that depository institutions receive provisional credit from the Federal Reserve for deposited
checks within one to two business days after such checks are deposited, many depository
institutions have imposed inordinate delays on availability; 4) the incidence of returned checks
amounts to approximately one percent of all checks written and a substantial portion of these
returned checks are paid on second presentment; 5) with few exceptions, efforts by state
government, federal agencies, and the financial industry have been unsuccessful in curbing the
found abuses; and 6) a coordinated federal response is the most reasonable way to assure that
depositors are treated fairly in gaining access to the funds in their accounts.
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the Federal Reserve Board to develop a plan to speed up the check collection
process."8 2 Second, the statute adopts maximum availability schedules." 3
Third, the statute requires disclosure of a bank's availability policy. s4 In
perhaps its most important section, the Act directs the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve to immediately develop "an expedited availability
schedule" '85 designed to meet certain availability goals. This process is to be
implemented no later than three years from the effective date of section 4
of the Act.'16 In order to achieve this goal, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve would be directed to consider certain specified alternatives
including, but not limited to, the following:8 7
1) automated check return;
2) uniform indorsement standards;
3) direct notification of dishonor, within specified time limits;
4) permitting return of all checks through the Federal Reserve System;
and
5) allowing the payor bank to directly return dishonored checks to the
depositary bank.",S
The feasibility of each of these alternatives will be discussed below. 8 9
The statute would also create a two-stage process for imposing mandated
maximum hold periods. Permanent hold period limitations would become
effective upon implementation of the new system of check collection dis-
cussed above. The check collection process would be revised to provide for
availability of local checks on the start of the business day' 9° following the
business day of deposit.' 9' Thus, Tuesday morning availability is required of
182. Id. § 3(a). See also infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
183. Id. §§ 3(b), 4, 5. See infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the availability scheme.
184. Id. §§ 9, 10.
185. Id. § 3(a)(l).
186. Section 4, providing for interim hold periods, would become effective 90 days after
enactment of the statute. Id. § 16(b). Therefore, the Federal Reserve process would have to be
in place within 3 years and 90 days from enactment of the Act.
187. Id. § 3(c)(l)-(5).
188. Curiously, the statute adopts language to identify the parties in the bank collection
process which is inconsistent with U.C.C. language. The statute begins by defining "depository
institution" as including all institutions covered in section 19(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Reserve
Act. Id. § 15(11). It then further differentiates between "originating depository institutions"
(as meaning "the branch of a depository institution on which a check is drawn"), id. § 15(14),
and the "receiving depository institutions" (as meaning "the branch of a depository institution
in which a check is first deposited"), id. § 15(15). To avoid confusion, this Article will employ
U.C.C. terminology, referring to the "originating depository institution" as the payor bank,
and the "receiving depository institution" as the depositary bank.
189. See infra notes 242-81 and accompanying text.
190. Much like the New York and California legislation discussed supra in notes 147-77
and accompanying text, the statute mandates availability in business days, rather than utilizing
the U.C.C. terminology of "banking day." The statute defines a "business day" as "any day
other than a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday." H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(3)
(1986).
191. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b)(1) (1986).
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checks deposited on Monday. The bill would also require that no more than
three business days intervene'9 between the business day of deposit and the
business day of availability of nonlocal1 93 checks . 94 Thus, Friday availability
is required of checks deposited Monday. Furthermore, the statute provides
for an interim availability schedule. Under the interim availability schedule,
cash deposits and wire transfer deposits would be available no later than the
business day after the business day of deposit or transfer. 9 Next business
day availability also would be required for checks of less than $100, checks
drawn on a branch of the depositary institution if both branches are located
in the same check processing region, or in the same state, a first-indorsed
check drawn on the United States, state, or local Treasury, and a first-
indorsed cashier's check, certified check, teller's check, or bank check. The
timetable for availability for other categories of checks is to be phased in
over a three year period with a schedule applicable to the first year and
more stringent schedules to take effect in the second and third years. In the
first year, not more than two business days could intervene between the
business day of deposit and the business day of availability for local checks. 1 96
Thus, Thursday availability is required for funds deposited on Monday.191
During this same year, no more than six business days could intervene
between the business day of deposit and the business day of availability for
nonlocal checks. 9 For a deposit on Monday, availability would be required
a week from the following Wednesday.'9 For the second and third years of
applicability, no more than one business day would intervene between the
business day of deposit and the business day of availability for local checks,200
and no more than six business days could intervene for nonlocal checks. 20 1
To minimize the risk of loss to the depositary institutions, exceptions to
the scheduled availability are provided in certain situations. Depositary
institutions are generally free to follow their own availability policy with
respect to several types of deposits:
1) funds deposited into new accounts; 20 2
2) funds totalling more than $5000 deposited into an account on any given
192. The statute is confusing, specifying the maximum number of business days that can
"intervene" between the day of deposit and the day of availability.
193. There will be no distinction between in-state and out-of-state checks, as is common
in current state legislation. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
194. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b)(2) (1986).
195. Id. § 4(a).
196. Id. § 4(c)(2).
197. This of course presumes that no holiday intervenes between the day of deposit and
the day of scheduled availability.
198. The length of the period is due to the intervention of the weekend between the time
of deposit and the time of availability. There will always be a weekend when the mandated
time period is six business days.
199. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1986).
200. Id. § 4(d)(3).
201. Id. § 4(d)(4).
202. Id. § 5(a) (new accounts are defined as accounts no older than 30 days). In the
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business day; 203
3) checks redeposited after an initial dishonor;204
4) items deposited into accounts that have been the subject of repeated
overdrafts ;2 °5 and
5) checks drawn on institutions located outside the United States. 206
In addition, mandatory hold periods would not apply when:
6) emergency conditions existed that might affect the speed with which the
deposited item could be processed through the collection system;207
7) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve suspended the appli-
cability of the Act after determining that banking institutions were expe-
riencing an unacceptable level of losses due to check related fraud;20s and
8) a depositary institution has reason to doubt the collectability of funds
deposited.2-
The statute also would require written disclosure of availability policies.
Notice would be made by pre-printed deposit slips, mailed notice, and posting
instance of new accounts, the statute still would require next day availability for cash, wire
transfer, and deposits by cashier's check, certified check, teller's check, bank check, or traveler's
check, but would allow the depositary institution to adopt its own policy with respect to other
deposits. Next day availability would be required only for funds deposited by cashier's check,
certified check, teller's check, bank check, or traveler's check with respect to the first $5,000
deposited. To the extent that the total deposits made by such items exceeded $5,000, no more
than eight business days could intervene between the date of deposit and the date of availability
of the excess amount.
203. Id. § 5(b). Where the total deposit exceeds $5,000, the statutory availability schedules
would apply only with respect to the first $5,000.
204. Id. § 5(c).
205. Id. § 5(d) (this would exempt the situation where the depositor has on three separate
and distinct occasions within any six month period written checks, drawn on his account with
the depositary bank, where there were insufficient funds to cover the checks written). This is
presumably seen as applicable to the depositary bank's ease of chargeback should the check be
subsequently dishonored. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
206. Id. § 5(e).
207. Id. § 5(f). The emergency conditions would include: 1) any interruption of commu-
nication facilities; 2) suspension of payments by another institution; 3) any war; and 4) any
emergency condition beyond the control of the depositary institution, if the depositary institution
exercises such diligence as the circumstances require.
208. Id. § 5(g). The permitted suspension can remain in effect for no more than 45
business days. Further, in the event of such suspension, a report justifying such action must
be made by the Federal Reserve Board to the appropriate congressional committees.
209. Id. § 5(h). For example, under this exemption, the availability schedules would be
inapplicable where the depositary bank has reason to believe that the drawer or drawee of the
check is, or is about to become, subject to bankruptcy, or reasonably believes that a situation
involving fraud or check kiting exists. This provision was the subject of a great deal of
congressional debate, and was added as an amendment on the day of passage. Those opposed
to the amendment feared that this would give banks too much leeway in avoiding the availability
schedules. Those in favor of the amendment wanted to afford depositary institutions a way to
avoid availability on items that would cause a reasonable party to suspect fraud. (i.e. where
there was a suspicious indorsement). See H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc.
H93 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1986).
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the notice in a conspicuous place at each depositary institution. The Federal
Reserve Board is given the authority to publish model disclosure forms to
facilitate compliance with the disclosure requirements.
There are several additional statutory provisions. The statute would require
that funds deposited into an interest-bearing account accrue interest no later
than the business day upon which the depositary institution receives provi-
sional credit for the item. 210 The Act would require the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve to establish a Payments System Advisory Council to
advise the Board in the exercise of its function under the Act. 211
Finally, provision is made for both administrative enforcement2 12 and civil
liability. The Act adopts a two-part damage scheme similar to the damage
provisions of other federal consumer protection statutes. 213 Under the pro-
visions of the Act, any institution that fails to comply with a requirement
imposed is liable to any person injured by that failure for actual damages
and statutory damages. Under the actual damage provision the offending
institution is liable for any actual damage sustained as a result of its failure
to comply. In addition to actual damages, a plaintiff could recover additional
amounts limited to no less than $100 and no more than $1,000.214 Plaintiffs
could also recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees. However, there
would be no liability for unintentional violations resulting from a bona fide
error, notwithstanding "the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted
to avoid any such error. '215
2. The Fair Deposit Availability Act of 1986216
The Fair Deposit Availability Act of 1986 (the Bill) differs markedly from
the House Act discussed above. The Bill adopts a two-part approach to the
problem of delayed availability. First, it would require disclosure of the
availability policies. Second, it would direct the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve to improve the check clearing system to meet specified goals.
210. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8. It is not uncommon for banks to begin to
accrue interest from the date of deposit notwithstanding delayed availability schedules. Wechsler,
supra note 4, at 1159.
211. Id. § Il(a).
212. Id. In general, each administrative agency is given the power to enforce the Act with
respect to the institutions it regulates.
213. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982) (Truth in Lending Act); Id. §§ 1681-1693 (Fair Credit
Reporting Act); Id. §§ 1691-1693 (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Id. at §§ 1692-1693 (Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act). See Dow, Damages Under the Federal Electronic Fund Transfer
Act: A Proposed Construction of Sections 910 and 915, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (1985).
214. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14(a) (1986). In class action suits, the statutory
recovery would have no minimum recovery but would be limited to no more than the lesser of
$500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the defendant institution. Id. § 14(a)(2)(B).
215. Id. § 14(c)(1). Bona fide errors include clerical, calculation, computer malfunction
and programming, and printing errors. Id. § 14(c)(2).
216. S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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Under the first part, every banking institution 21 7 would be required to
provide written disclosure of its general availability policy. In addition, the
institution would be required to post at each location a clear and conspicuous
notice setting forth this general policy, and mail an annual reminder to each
depositor. 2  The Federal Reserve Board would be authorized to publish
model disclosure forms to facilitate compliance with the disclosure require-
ments. The Federal Reserve Board also would be directed to prepare a
regulation for the purpose of improving the check clearing system. Improve-
ments in the check clearing process should allow funds deposited by local
checks to be available upon expiration of one business day after deposit and
funds deposited by all other checks to be available upon expiration of three
business days after deposit. 21 9 The regulation should be published for com-
ment no later than eighteen months after enactment 220 and should be effective
no later than thirty-six months after enactment. 221 The Federal Reserve Board
also would be instructed to consider thirteen methods of improving funds
availability.
222
The Bill would mandate availability schedules for only one category of
checks: those where the deposited check is a first-endorsed check drawn on
the Treasury of the United States. In those instances, the funds would be
available no later than the date upon which the depositary institution is given
217. The statute is not written in language consistent with the U.C.C. For the purposes
of this Article, U.C.C. terminology will be employed.
218. Id. § 1003(a)-(b).
219. Id. § 1005(a)(l)-(2). It is not clear what the statutory language "upon expiration of"
means. Where availability is required "upon expiration of one business day after deposit"
presumably this requires availability on close of business on Tuesday for Monday deposits.
220. Id. § 1005(a).
221. Id. § 1005(c).
222. S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1005(b)(l)-(13) (1986) lists these methods:
1) adopting a uniform endorsement standard;
2) providing for direct notification of returned checks;
3) providing for direct return of checks;
4) providing for return of all checks through the Federal Reserve;
5) extending time limits for returns (this is often proposed because it is thought
that the current midnight deadline encourages the use of the United States Mail to
return checks rather than the use of more efficient couriers. It has been suggested
that by extension of the midnight deadline to the following morning less banks
would return items by use of the slow and inefficient means of the United States
Mail);
6) establishing schedules for the availability of funds;
7) prescribing the availability of funds based on the nature of the account to which
the deposit was made or the nature of the account holder;
8) the use of electronic means of collecting and returning checks;
9) providing for check truncation;
10) the establishment of an automated return system;
11) charging based upon notification that a check will be presented for payment;
12) creating incentives for payor banks to return unpaid items promptly to the
depositary institution; and
13) keeping the costs of any improvements to be implemented to a minimum.
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provisional credit for the item. 23 The Bill also contains several miscellaneous
provisions. Where funds are deposited into interest-bearing accounts, de-
positary institutions would be required to compute interest on deposited
funds no later than the date upon which the institution receives provisional
credit for the item. The bank would be permitted to delay the accrual of
interest only if the computation of interest began at a later date for all
deposits, including cash deposits.224 The Bill would create an Expedited Funds
Availability Council to advise and consult with the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve. 225 The Bill also would provide for both administrative
enforcement 226 and civil liability. With respect to civil liability, a depositary
institution which failed to comply with disclosure, interest, or availability
provisions would be liable to an injured party for both actual damages and
statutory damages, 227 except where such failure resulted from a bona fide
error.
22 1
E. Evaluation of Proposed Federal Legislation
In many respects the proposed federal statutes are substantially similar.
Both proposed statutes mandate disclosure which is an important, but not
sufficient, component of any solution. 2 9 Both recognize that the only long-
term actual solution to the delayed availability problem lies in revision of
the check collection process. The major substantive difference between the
two bills is that the Senate Bill does not contain maximum availability
schedules. Instead, the Federal Reserve Board would be directed to prom-
ulgate a regulation to improve the check collection system with the view
toward reaching certain specified availability goals. The plan would be
prepared within eighteen months and implemented within three years. There
would be no maximum hold periods imposed during this three year planning
period. This approach is flawed in several respects. First, consumers would
See generally N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 51, § 2.01, at 2-1 to 2-4 (explanation
of the various forms of check truncation). See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
223. S.2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1006. If the date upon which provisional credit is
given is not a business day, the funds should be made available on the next business day.
224. Id. § 1004. Where the accrual of interest is delayed, the depositary bank must provide
a written disclosure of that fact. Id. § 1003(g).
225. Id. § 1005(d).
226. Id. § 1007. The administrative enforcement scheme is substantially similar to the
administrative enforcement scheme contained in H.R. 2443 outlined above. See supra note 212
and accompanying text.
227. S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1008 (1986). Again, this is substantially similar to
H.R. 2443 outlined above. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. With respect to
statutory damages, the court may allow damages of not less than $50 nor more than $500. S.
2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1008(a)(2)(A) (1986).
228. S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1008(b) (1986). The language here mirrors the
language contained in H.R. 2443 outlined above. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadequacies
of disclosure as the sole remedy.
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wait at least three years before the hope of any relief. Second, even after
the expiration of the three year period, there would be no guarantee of
relief. The Federal Reserve would be directed only to promulgate a regulation
to improve the check collection system with the intent of meeting specified
availability goals. Thus, while the Senate Bill provides a goal of availability
it does not mandate achievement of the goal even after expiration of the
three year period. This is intended to provide the Federal Reserve Board
with flexibility to deal with availability issues.230 However, leaving sole
discretion with the Federal Reserve Board might very well defeat the intent
of the Senate Bill. There is no guarantee that after initiation of any Federal
Reserve Board regulation that improvement in availability would be achieved.
In fact, history suggests otherwise. The Federal Reserve Board has been
extremely reluctant to do anything about availability. It has opposed man-
dated availability schedules and has consistently maintained that proposed
schedules (much like the goals set forth in the Senate Bill) are unrealistic
and unobtainable. Therefore, to expect the Federal Reserve to implement a
plan to achieve those goals is unrealistic and will prove to be unobtainable.
The approach taken in the House Act is more sound. The House Act
would achieve the goal which fairness dictates - more rapid availability
with little risk of additional loss to the banking community. It also provides
for the achievement of an ultimate solution - revision of the bank collection
process. The House Act does not require, however, that depositors wait for
their funds while the banking community argues over how best to achieve
that revision. Mandating maximum availability schedules provides incentives
for banks to change the process to meet these schedules. The bank collection
process is, after all, the method banks have chosen to implement check
collection. 21 If the present process becomes economically unsound, an al-
ternative process may be sought.
Accepting the importance of maximum availability schedules in any leg-
islation does not end the analysis. One must examine the specific schedules
proposed to determine whether they are feasible. In analyzing the efficacy
of the maximum availability schedules imposed by the House Act, one must
consider the benefits to be achieved to consumers weighed against the
potential for loss to depositary banks.23 2 In this regard, two questions must
230. H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1985) (dissenting views on H.R. 2443);
H.R. REP. No. 404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1985) (statement of P. Martin, Member, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
231. It should, however, be remembered that banks must operate within the parameters
of the U.C.C. and Regulation J. The current requirement of the physical return of the item
through each step in the collection chain by a series of midnight deadlines contributes to the
problem. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text. The "3-4-8" Committee of the
Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC is currently drafting a proposed revision of Articles 3
and 4 of the U.C.C. However, this issue may not be addressed. See Miller, Report on the New
Payments Code, 41 Bus. LAW. 1007, 1010 (1986).
232. In fact, if the adopted plan creates additional losses, these losses surely will be passed
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be answered. First, are the hold periods themselves reasonable, including
both the interim and the permanent availability timetables? Second, is the
period of time within which the Federal Reserve Board must implement
change in the bank collection process and within which the permanent
availability schedule must be met, reasonable?
The first question is made more difficult by the fact that there are two
availability schedules that should be examined. The proposed interim avail-
ability schedules would achieve the desired balance between speed of avail-
ability and risk of loss. These hold periods are no more stringent than the
periods currently being complied with under state statutes. 233 In fact, the
maximum hold periods specified, particularly during the first year, would
not be substantially different from the average hold periods commonly
imposed at the present time.234 As with similar state legislation, the major
advantage of the House Act is the elimination of unusually high hold
periods. 235 Moreover, as with similar state legislation, the House Act provides
sufficient exceptions to the availability schedules to allow depositary banks
to protect themselves in situations where an increased risk of loss is likely. 236
Thus, hold periods can be limited to the extent provided by the interim hold
periods without significant increased losses. 237
Reaching a similar conclusion with respect to the permanent availability
schedules is more difficult because a great deal of speculation is required.
Whether banks could comply with the mandated availability schedules with-
out a significant increased risk of loss depends upon whether the method
on to depositors in the form of increased service charges or higher interest rates. It is therefore
clearly to the benefit of all to avoid imposition of unreasonable risk of loss to the depositary
banks.
233. For example, under New York legislation, banks are given two business days to make
local checks available, three business days to make in-state checks available, and six business
days to make out-of-state checks available. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text. By
comparison, H.R. 2443 would require that local checks be made available in three business
days (no more than two business days can intervene between the day of deposit and the day
of availability) and that nonlocal checks be available in seven business days for the first year;
that local checks be made available in two business days and that nonlocal checks be available
in seven business days for the second and third years. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying
text. Under the provisions of H.R. 2443, local checks are only those checks drawn on the
depositary institution in the same check processing region or in the same state as the depositary
bank. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3(b)(1), 15(12) (1986). Nonlocal checks would include
checks referred to in the state legislation as out-of-state checks.
234. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text for a comparison of the New York
and California legislation with pre-statutory practice; see also Iovacchini, Laws to Limit Checks'
Hold Periods Have Minimal Effect on Processing, BANK SYSTEMS & EQUIPMENT 49 (Apr. 1985)
(state legislation required little change in most banks' holding practices).
235. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of this factor with
respect to state legislation.
236. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
237. The experience at the state level supports this conclusion. Compliance with state
statute has not caused a significant increase in bank loss. See supra note 172 and accompanying
text.
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chosen by the Federal Reserve Board to speed up the bank collection process
can meet the required schedule. It is not entirely clear that this will be
possible. The permanent availability schedules would require next day avail-
ability for local checks and availability within four business days238 for
nonlocal checks. 23 9 Because processing of the check toward the payor bank
is already highly automated, improvements are unlikely. Any decrease in
check clearing times would, therefore, have to be achieved by improvement
in the return process. Whether or not this can be achieved to provide for
the payment availability schedule is unclear. Given the uncertainty, it seems
unwise to mandate the permanent availability schedules discussed. A more
sensible approach might be to allow the Federal Reserve Board, in conjunc-
tion with the Payment Systems Advisory Council, to create availability
schedules upon implementation of the improved check clearing system. These
schedules should in no event delay availability beyond the times specified in
the second and third years of the interim availability schedules. The Federal
Reserve Board could assess the effectiveness of the improved system and
determine to what extent speed of processing has been increased, and in
turn, determine a reasonable availability schedule. Any such evaluations
could be in the progress reports the House Act requires the Federal Reserve
Board to make to Congress. 24°
The second question concerns whether or not the Federal Reserve Board
can reasonably be expected to implement improvements in the check clearing
process with the three year period specified. Again, the answer is sheer
speculation. It does, however, appear likely that the three year timetable is
sufficient .241
F. Improvement in the Check Clearing System
The ultimate answer to the problem of delayed funds availability is to
improve the check clearing system. Because depositary banks are never given
notice of final payment, they are reluctant to give depositors access to their
funds until they are reasonably sure that final payment has been made.
Depositary banks can only hope that final payment has been made when
sufficient time has elapsed for notice of a dishonored check to reach them. 242
The waiting time can be substantial. While checks are cleared by swift
computerized means on their way to the payor bank, the return process is
slow and time-consuming. The solution, therefore, is to address the very
238. No more than three business days could intervene between the day of deposit and
the day of availability.
239. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
240. H.R. 2443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(e) (1986).
241. One commentator concluded that the corollary five year period in previously proposed
H.R. 5301 was far too long and that the three year period in S. 2851 was realistic. Wechsler,
supra note 4, at 1187, 1191.
242. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the
relation between the bank collection system and the delayed availability problem.
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nature of the problem: the check collection system. The banking community
recognizes the need for reform in the check return process. Processing costs
of return items represent a disproportionate share of total processing costs243
and are growing rapidly.244 Suggestions for reform focus either on speeding
up the return process or speeding up the process by which depositary banks
receive notice of dishonor.
G. Electronic Fund Transfers
Some suggest that adoption of a completely electronic fund transfer system
would eliminate any problems of funds availability. Arguably all problems
would be avoided if consumers utilized existing electronic fund transfers
alternatives. 245 However, consumers have been unwilling to abandon checks
in favor of electronic fund transfers. 246 A somewhat related alternative would
be the adoption of check truncation. 47 However, neither a full scale electronic
fund transfer system, nor a more limited check truncation2 48 alternative, is
243. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 2, 23. In 1973, the cost of
processing return items totalld $125 million. This represented 11% of total processing costs.
Banks incurred these costs despite the fact that return items accounted for only two thirds of
one percent of all checks processed. Id. at 23.
244. Id. at 1. It is thought that return processing costs will increase unless corrective
action takes place to streamline processing. Id. at 7. The Bank Administration Institute
recommends that: "It might be well for banks to assume more risks or to work toward
modification of the current legal requirements in an effort to reduce processing costs." Id. at
5.
245. 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 195-97 (statement of P. Martin, Member, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
246. BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 89, at 1-4, 137-139; Dow, supra note
213, at 1; Fox, supra note 89.
247. There are two types of check truncation: drawee bank check retention and depositary
bank check retention. In drawee bank check retention, the check is processed as it is presented,
but instead of being returned to the customer with his monthly bank statement, it is retained
at the payor/drawee bank. In depositary bank check retention, on the other hand, the depositary
bank retains the check and makes presentment to the payor bank by electronic communications.
See generally N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 51, at § 2.01 (explaining the various forms
of check truncation). For the purposes of this Article the term check truncation will be used
to refer solely to depositary bank check retention.
248. Drawee bank check retention is currently in use. Id. Depositary bank check truncation
is under study. Banks are experimenting with image capturing as a method of electronically
transmitting check data. Fitch, The Check in Its Own Image, U.S. BANKER 38 (Jan. 1986).
Several pilot projects are currently experimenting with depositary bank check retention. During
1985, certain Federal Reserve Banks offered truncation services to local payor banks. The
Federal Reserve also participated with the American Bankers Association in a truncation
experiment, See Miller & Ballen, The Federal Reserve and The Payments System: 1985, 41 Bus.
LAW. 1399, 1404 (1986). In addition, the American Bankers Association and the Federal Reserve
have participated through the National Association for Check Safekeeping in truncation of
corporate dividend checks. Fitch, supra, at 42. See European American Will Soon Test Fast
Check Processing System: 'Digitized Image' Reduces Size of Paper by Three-Fourths, Allowing
High-Speed Handling, AM. BANKER 3 (June 3, 1984).
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available currently nor are they likely to be available in the near future .49
This suggestion should be rejected because it fails to address directly the
issues surrounding existing delays.
H. Direct Notification of Dishonor
Under direct notification, payor banks that dishonor items would be
required to notify depositary banks of the dishonor within a specified period
of time. Checks would be handled as before but delays would be substantially
reduced because depositary banks would be free to release funds without
fear of loss after the expiration of the time period. A limited version of
direct notification is currently in use for checks in amounts of $2500 or
more collected through the Federal Reserve System.2 0 This requirement is
part of a recent amendment to Regulation J, intended by the Federal Reserve
Board to reduce the need for substantial hold periods.2 5 ,
Regulation J, as amended,' 5 2 requires a payor bank that dishonors an item
to provide notice of nonpayment so that such notice is received by the
depositary bank by midnight of the second banking day following the day
on which the payor bank is required to dishonor the item. 253 For example,
if a check is presented for payment on Monday, the payor bank would have
until midnight Tuesday to dishonor the item and would be required to notify
the depositary bank of the dishonor by Thursday. The payor bank could
provide the required notification by any means,254 such as telephone, certified
mail, or electronic wire. The payor bank would be required to include with
the notification certain information specified in the regulation, provided that
249. Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1197-98. A study by Trans Data Corporation found that
approximately 25% of all financial institutions truncate checking services. Garsson, Truncation
Losing Ground as Banks Concentrate on Other Matters, AM. BANKER 15 (Apr. 18, 1984).
250. Amendments to Federal Reserve Board Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734 (1985)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210.12(c)). For a brief overview of the Amendment, see Miller &
Ballen, supra note 248, at 1400-02. At first glance, limiting the requirement of direct notice
might seem curious. It is exactly these large figures that are excluded from coverage of state
and proposed statutes mandating shorter hold periods. However, the intent of both legislative
and administrative action is to limit the risk to the depositary bank.
251. For a discussion of the wire notice requirement, see Mulford, The Federal Reserve's
Wire Notice of Nonpayment, 100 BNKinuo L.J. 622 (1983).
252. Prior provisions of Regulation J and operating circulars required notification of
nonpayment to the presenting bank. There were several problems with the previous approach.
First, notification was not required to be made to the depositary bank. Second, it was unclear
who had to give notice, when notice was to be given, and what information had to be included
in the notice. Third, because no sanctions were imposed for noncompliance, the notification
requirements were often ignored. See Jordan, supra note 2, at 538-42. Each of these problems
has been addressed in the amended provisions. See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
253. Amendments to Regulation J, 50 Fed. Reg. 5734, 5740 (codified at 12 C.F.R. §
210.12(c)(2)).
254. Id. § 210.12(c)(2).
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it is able to determine the information from the face of the item. 25 Substantial
penalties are included for noncompliance. A payor institution that fails to
exercise ordinary care in complying with the requirement is liable to the
depositary bank for losses incurred by the depositary bank, up to the amount
of the item, if the loss would have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary
care by the payor bank. In addition, a payor bank that fails to act in good
faith may be liable for consequential damages. 25 6
At first glance, direct notification for all dishonored checks in the clearing
system appears to be an attractive alternative to shortening the hold periods.
The forward process of check clearing is already rapid. This alternative
eliminates delays while waiting for the return without extensive and costly
changes in the check clearing system. However, this alternative imposes costs
of its own. No matter which method of notification is chosen, it is likely
that the notice procedure would be labor intensive. Bank employees would
have the tasks of wiring or telephoning individual depositary banks. This
would require determining which bank is the depositary bank, 25 7 as well as
communicating with thousands of foreign banks. 2 8 Given the immense vol-
ume of checks returned each year, 2 9 this additional burden would be stag-
gering, and totally impracticable if imposed on a general level. Moreover,
this labor burden would be imposed in addition to the present labor intensive
method of returning checks, because the present method of returning checks
through each level of intermediary banks with manual handling at each stage
would be retained.
I. Standard Indorsement
The procedure by which endorsements are affixed to checks contributes
to the delay in returning dishonored checks. A cursory glance at the back
of a canceled check will illustrate the haphazard manner in which collecting
banks indorse checks in no apparent order. A payor or collecting bank
255. Id. § 210.12(3). The information sent to the depositary bank must include the name
of the payor bank, the name of the payee, the amount of the item, the reason for return, the
date of the indorsement of the depositary bank, the account number of the depositor, the
branch at which the item was first deposited, and the trace number on the item of the depositary
bank. Further, the Federal Reserve Board has encouraged payor banks to include additional
information in the notification such as the drawer of the check, the number of the check, the
date of the check, the presenting institution, and any other useful information. See id. §210.12(c)(2).
256. Id. § 210.12(c)(6).
257. This is not an easy task given the haphazard manner in which endorsements are
placed upon checks. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
258. It is now common for banks to maintain correspondent relationships with a small
number of banks. This added communication burden could be eliminated because the Federal
Reserve will provide notification services.
259. Three hundred and sixty million checks were returned through the Federal Reserve
in 1981. Cooper, supra note 2, at 535. It is estimated that two percent of all returned checks
are in amounts greater than $2,500. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. Even this
percentage represents a substantial number of direct notifications required.
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attempting to return a check spends considerable time and effort deciphering
to whom the check should next be sent. This adds to the return time required
for processing and virtually requires manual processing of the item.
As a partial solution to the availability issue, standard endorsements have
been proposed. Such an indorsement standard was developed in 1981 by the
American National Standards Institute. (ANSI).260 This Would require a
standardized placement of indorsement on the back of checks so that the
depositary bank and each collecting bank would have specific places for
indorsement. This, it has been suggested, would greatly simplify the manual
return routing process and make automated return of checks more feasible.
The substantial cost entailed in purchasing the necessary check processing
equipment is purportedly a major impediment to adoption of the standard
indorsement. 26' More importantly, it is doubtful whether adoption of a
uniform indorsement standard could increase the speed of processing enough
to significantly effect availability schedules. Adoption of a uniform indorse-
ment standard would merely speed up a basically flawed system, and then
only to a very small degree. It would do nothing to change the basic problem
of repeated manual handling of the item. However, a modified form of
standard endorsements might prove useful. Any indorsement form which
provides ease of identifying the depositary bank is essential to the successful
implementation of either direct notification 262 or direct return.263
J. Methods to Allow Electronic Processing of Return Items
It has been suggested that any reform of the check collection process
should address the problem of check returns by allowing electronic processing
of return items. 264 One way to accomplish this is by the use of carrier
envelopes with pre-printed MICR strips bearing the routing symbols of the
depositary bank. 265 This would allow electronic processing of return items
260. The standard is referred to as ANSI x9.3-1981. Copies of the standard are available
from the Order Department of the American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway,
New York, N.Y. 10018. The cost is $4.00.
261. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 201-02 (statement of P. Martin, Member, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
262. See supra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
263. See infra notes 273-81 and accompanying text.
264. See generally Leary, A Proposal for the Automation of Returns of Cash Items, 19
U.C.C. L.J. 47 (1986). Leary further stipulates that any plan for automated processing should
comply with the following specifications:
1) it should not require new equipment or new procedures applicable to all items;
2) it should enable return items to be included in outgoing cash letters of the payor
bank; 3) it must preserve the item for later machine processing if the item is
represented following dishonor.
Id. at 48-49.
265. The Federal Reserve and the American Bankers Association have been conducting
an experiment using return-item carrier envelopes. Miller & Ballen, supra note 248, at 1402.
Another carrier experiment is also being conducted through Continental Illinois Bank in Chicago.
Leary, supra note 264, at 57 n.32. Apparently, the program has not been enthusiastically
accepted by banks. Id.
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similar to the processing that is now common for the forward trip. 266 A
related suggestion advocates that a MICR identification of the depositary
bank be placed upon the item either by the depositary bank or the payor
bank. 267
The major objections to these proposals focus on the current technology
available26 and the cost of any additional processing. These objections are
without merit. Banks that currently possess automated check processing
systems already have several ways of initiating MICR processing for returns.
These range from the paste-over method, 26 9 to the use of a full-length MICR
strip with the depositary bank's routing symbols. 270 In addition, the cost of
such processing would be minimal. 271 Furthermore, new equipment expen-
ditures would be required.
K. Direct Return of Items
Another proposal to improve the check collection process is direct return
of dishonored items. Under the present system, dishonored items are returned
to the depositary institution via the same route traveled toward the payor
bank, only the return trip is conducted manually rather than by automa-
tion. 272 Direct return of items entails returning dishonored items directly to
the depositary institution rather than through collecting banks. Direct return
is authorized by optional U.C.C. section 4-212(2).273 If a returning bank opts
to directly return an item to the depositary bank, it then recovers the amount
266. This apparently has been used in Canada with some success. Jordan, supra note 2,
at 560.
267. For an excellent discussion of suggestions relevant to electronic processing of this
sort, see Leary, supra note 264, at 58-65. Leary discusses the type of MICR strip utilized and
the placement of such strip.
268. Objections have focused on the question of where to imprint the necessary MICR
information. It is asserted that there is no room on the standard check for an additional MICR
line, and that enlargement of the standard check is not favored. See Wechsler, supra note 4,
at 1209 n.527.
269. The white-tape, paste-over method is currently used where a encoding error is detected.
The properly encoded information is simply pasted over the error. This method could be
employed for return item processing by pasting over the payor bank's routing numbers with
the depositary bank's routing information. See Leary, supra note 264, at 58 (where the author
rejects this method because of its limitations upon representment).
270. Leary favors this approach over the paste-over method because of the ease with
which the added MICR strip could be removed to facilitate representment. See Leary, supra
note 264, at 59.
271. The cost of the full-length MICR strip has been estimated to be $0.009 per check.
The cost of carrier envelopes has been placed at $0.014 per carrier. Neither of these costs
represent a significant expense considering that these costs would not be imposed upon all
checks collected but only upon the return items. Processing of return checks already represents
a disproportionate share of the total processing costs. See supra note 243-44 and accompanying
text.
272. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
273. U.C.C. § 4-212(2) (1978).
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of the check directly from the depositary bank, allowing all provisional
settlements to become final.2 74
Since 1983 the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has been experimenting
with a pilot program on direct return (the Dallas pilot project). 275 In order
to return a check through this project, the payor returns the item to the
Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, which, in turn, returns the item to the depos-
itary bank. 276 The results of the experiment have been promising. Return
time for checks has been considerably reduced277 at minimal cost. 278 However,
in order to have a favorable effect on funds availability, the program must
be mandatory and instituted nationwide.
Alternatively, if some items are returned directly and quickly but others
are not, the depositary bank would have no way of knowing in advance
whether the dishonored checks will be returned directly or through the time-
consuming method presently used. This would result in the need for hold
periods presently asserted. One major obstacle to adopting direct return on
a national level is state law. Several states279 have not yet adopted U.C.C.
section 4-212(2)2 0 which authorizes direct return. The Federal Reserve Board
is urging those states to change their law to accommodate direct return. 28 ,
VI. CONCLUSION
The present policy of delayed funds availability is unfair to depositors
and is not justified by legitimate banking concerns. In the typical situation,
banks are permitted access to deposited funds, both in terms of income and
reserve account requirements, long before the depositors are given access to
the same funds. This is commonplace, despite the fact that little risk of
274. Id. § 4-212 comment 4.
275. The experiment is being conducted in a series of phases. Ultimately, the pilot project
will offer direct return even for checks originally collected outside the Federal Reserve System
for payers located in the Dallas District. This would extend to situations where the depositary
bank was located outside of the district. See Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1203-05.
276. For a general description of how the pilot program works, see Dallas Fed Implements
Check Returns, Saves Time for District Institutions. BANK SYSTEMS & EQUIPMENT 51 (Apr.
1985).
277. Early in Phase II of the three phase project, return time was reduced by about two
days. 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, (statement of P. Martin, Member Board of Governors
Federal Reserve); Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1205 n.506.
278. The charge imposed by the Federal Reserve for return items is $0.50 per item. This
charge is reduced to $0.25 per item if the items are capable of being machine processed.
Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1205 n.509. It should be noted that return item processing costs
already account for a disproportionate percentage of total check processing costs. It has been
estimated that the average cost of return item processing in 1974 was $0.75 per item. BANK
ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 25.
279. The District of Columbia, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin
do not permit the direct return of items. Leary, supra note 264, at 55 n.23.
280. Section 4-212(2) of the U.C.C. is optional. See U.C.C. § 4-212(2) comment 4 (1978).
281. 1985 Hearing, supra note 50, at 198-99 (statement of P. Martin, Member, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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dishonor and subsequent depositary bank loss exists. Customers, for the
most part, are given no opportunity to object to this treatment.
A. Necessary Components to a Viable Solution
There are no easy solutions to the delayed availability problem. Any
solution must be cost-efficient and balance the need for fairness to depositors
with the need to minimize risk of loss to depositary banks. Any viable
solution must include several components - disclosure, maximum hold
periods, and improvement in the check collection process. None of these
components would be adequate without the others.
Bank disclosure of hold periods imposed on deposited checks is essential.
As long as public opinion is such that the average depositor is unfamiliar
with the policy of delayed availability, and as long as bank practices vary,
disclosure will be required. In addition, it should be remembered that most
consumer complaints regarding delayed availability stem from lack of knowl-
edge of the depositary bank's policies. However disclosure alone is insuffi-
cient because it does not address the basic unfairness of allowing depositary
banks unlimited access to customer funds without adequate justification.
The second major component necessary to any solution to the problem
of delayed funds availability is legislated maximum availability schedules.
Without maximum availability schedules, banks are free to continue the
unfair policy of imposing delayed availability. The policy of allowing banks
to determine their own reasonable availability schedules is unworkable.
Allowing the Federal Reserve Board flexibility to develop schedules would
be equally fruitless given past Federal Reserve reluctance to regulate avail-
ability.
The last major component, and the ultimate solution to the problem of
delayed availability, is improvement in the check clearing process. Only by
changing the process by which checks are cleared through the check collection
process, in particular the check return process, can a long term solution be
achieved. Without this change any mandated availability solution will be at
the expense of additional risk of loss to the depositary banks.
B. Need for a Federal Statute
The delayed availability solution will best be achieved by adoption of
federal legislation. Legislation adopted at the state level can only address
the problem in a piecemeal fashion because most states will ignore the issue
and those states that address the issue will adopt different solutions. More
importantly, state legislation is unable to mandate any reform of the check
clearing system. A federal statute must be adopted. Such a federal statute
should be similar to the House Act discussed above. Any successful legislation
must include the necessary components outlined above.
A successful statute must require depositary institutions to disclose avail-
ability policies when an account is opened, periodically as a reminder, and
by posting the policies in the bank. Disclosure would eliminate many prob-
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lems caused by delayed availability by allowing customers to plan more
efficiently.
Second, a successful statute must direct the Federal Reserve Board to take
action to improve the method by which the check collection system operates,
and specify a reasonable timetable for the implementation of the change. A
three year period appears to be reasonable. Furthermore, a successful statute
must provide for maximum availability schedules. Interim schedules should
be created to impose availability limits during the check collection revision
process. The interim schedules must reasonably balance the need for avail-
ability with consideration of the risk of loss to depositary institutions stem-
ming from returned checks. The schedules set forth in the House Act appear
to achieve this goal. Checks are placed in various categories depending upon
the risk of loss to the depositary bank. Checks in categories in which there
is perceived to be little danger of return, such as cashier's checks or checks
drawn upon the United States government, should be made available shortly
after deposit. The timetable imposed for general availability must be rea-
sonable. The timetable selected in the House Act appears to be adequate.
Exception must be made for categories of checks in which a greater than
average risk of loss is perceived. The House Act adequately protects depos-
itary institutions in this regard.
In addition, some attention should be paid to permanent availability
guidelines. Imposing permanent availability schedules at this time is pre-
mature. "The schedules specified in the House Act might be feasible if
improvements can be made in check clearing. Determination of reasonable
availability timetables in light of improvements in the check clearing system
which are neither developed nor implemented is sheer speculation. Such
speculation is inappropriate in a statute of this nature. Instead, the Federal
Reserve should be given the power to impose permanent availability schedules
after implementation of the improvements mandated. This would provide
flexibility without speculating about improvements in the collection process.
General guidelines could be prepared so that permanent availability schedules
would not delay availability beyond the time periods set forth in the interim
availability schedules.
C. Improvements in the Check Collection Process
The root of the delayed availability problem lies in the means by which
checks are presently collected, in particular the means by which dishonored
checks are returned. Therefore, the ultimate solution lies in changing this
process. Several possible alternatives have been discussed. Improvement can
best be achieved through provisions for automated return of checks. Either
a workable method of affixing the MICR encoding symbols of the depositary
bank to the item can be achieved, or encoded carrier envelopes can be used.
There are virtually no persuasive arguments against the use of automated
return.
However, it will take some time to implement the change advocated. Other
improvements might be adopted to speed the process in the interim. Direct
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send of the items from the depositary bank to the payor bank should be
encouraged in all instances, and a standard indorsement for the depositary
bank is desirable. Direct return, as is now available through the Dallas pilot
project, should be expanded. Direct notice of dishonor, however, should be
rejected as an alternative applicable to all checks. Such notice is effective to
reduce the risk of loss to the depositary bank when applied to checks in
amounts greater than $2500. Checks in such amounts account for a sub-
stantial percentage of the loss from dishonored checks, but only a small
percentage of returned checks. Therefore, reductions in the risk of loss are
achieved without imposing inordinate burdens in terms of notification re-
quirements upon payor banks. This would not be the case if the direct notice
requirement were extended to cover all checks. In such a case, the burden
of notice would outweigh the benefits to be achieved.
Although the problem of delayed availability is complex, it can be solved.
This Article has presented the reader with one proposal for minimizing
hardship to the depositor without imposing unreasonable risks upon the
depositary institutions.
